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Article

The Public Cost of Private Equity
William Magnuson†
INTRODUCTION
The rise of private equity over the past decade has raised a
number of important questions about corporate governance,
stakeholder rights, and the role of corporate law in managing
and regulating the fast-changing world of business. Critics of the
industry have lamented that private equity firms destroy companies by layering on debt, firing employees, and cutting costs
at every opportunity. 1 Proponents respond that any changes
they make to companies—and they dispute the charges about
destroying jobs 2—are painful but necessary remedies to improve
the inefficient and bloated companies that they acquire. 3 In the
† Associate Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A., Università di Padova; A.B., Princeton University. The
author wishes to thank Holger Spamann, Steven Davidoff Solomon, John Coyle,
Yesha Yadav, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Michael Coenen, Jacob Eisler, Vanessa
Casado Perez, and Jane Magnuson for helpful comments and suggestions. Copyright © 2018 by William Magnuson.
1. E.g., Anthony Luzzatto Gardner, Romney’s Bain Yielded Private Gain,
Public Loss, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 16, 2012), https://www.bloomberg.com/
view/articles/2012-07-15/romney-s-bain-yielded-private-gains-socialized-losses;
Danielle Ivory et al., When You Dial 911 and Wall Street Answers, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (June 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/business/
dealbook/when-you-dial-911-and-wall-street-answers.html; Private Equity: The
Barbarian Establishment, ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.economist
.com/news/briefing/21709007-private-equity-has-prospered-while-almost-every
-other-approach-business-has-stumbled.
2. E.g., ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & NAM D. PHAM, AMERICAN JOBS AND THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY TRANSACTIONS 9 (2008), http://www.sonecon.com/
docs/studies/0108_JobsPrivateEquityTransactions.pdf; Steven J. Davis et al.,
Private Equity, Jobs, and Productivity, 104 SONECON 3956, 3987–88 (2014);
Grace Wong, Private Equity and the Job Cut Myth, CNN MONEY (May 2, 2007),
http://money.cnn.com/2007/05/02/markets/pe_jobs/index.htm.
3. E.g., Felix Barber & Michael Goold, The Strategic Secret of Private Equity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2007), https://www.hbr.org/2007/09/the-strategic
-secret-of-private-equity; Herb Engert, Private Equity’s Value Creation Secrets,
FORBES (June 25, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ey/2014/06/25/private
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face of these controversies, private equity has continued to prosper: new firms are opening up at a rapid pace, money is flowing
into the industry, and private equity compensation remains
stratospheric. 4
Conventional wisdom holds that private equity has resolved,
or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law: the conflict between management and
ownership.5 According to this line of thought, private equity
-equitys-value-creation-secrets/#230ba35519d0; Steven N. Kaplan, How To
Think about Private Equity, AM. ENTER. INST. (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.aei
.org/publication/how-to-think-about-private-equity; Dan McCrum, Blackstone
Chief Hits Out at Attacks on Sector, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012), https://www.ft
.com/content/34bc99de-4da7-11e1-bb6c-00144feabdc0.
4. The number of active private equity firms has increased 143% since
2000, and 620 new firms were founded in 2015 alone. Number of Active PE
Firms Up 143% Since 2000: A Global Breakdown, PITCHBOOK (June 10, 2015),
https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/number-of-active-pe-firms-up-143-since
-2000-a-global-breakdown; Private Equity: The Barbarian Establishment, supra
note 1. Since 2013, private equity funds have raised $500 billion annually, with
Bain & Company concluding that “[t]he past year saw the best environment for
fund-raising since the precrash boom.” BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY
REPORT 2016, at iii (2016), http://www.bain.com/Images/Bain_and_Company_
Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf. And the top private equity managers
continue to earn tremendous sums: Steve Schwarzman of the Blackstone Group
is estimated to have earned $690 million in 2014, while Leon Black of Apollo
Global Management received $330 million. William Alden, Leon Black of Apollo
Global Got $331 Million Payout in 2014, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 27, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/business/dealbook/leon-black-of-apollo
-global-got-331-million-payout-in-2014.html; Ryan Dezember, Blackstone
Group CEO Collected $690 Million In 2014, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2015), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/blackstone-group-ceo-took-home-690-million-in-2014
-1425078294.
5. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 222–
25 (2010) (outlining the advantages that private equity’s governance structure
has over public company structures); Scott J. Davis, Would Changes in the Rules
for Director Selection and Liability Help Public Companies Gain Some of Private
Equity’s Advantages?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 85 (2009) (stating that the greater
contact between owners and management in private equity governance structures “helps PE Portfolio Companies solve one of the central problems of public
corporations: the inability of widely dispersed equity owners to adequately ensure that management is competent, is not running the company for its own
benefit, and is not committing fraud”); Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete
Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 252 (2008) (stating that “private equity ownership align[s] management and shareholder incentives”); Michael C.
Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986) [hereinafter Jensen, Agency Costs] (arguing
that private equity’s debt structure creates incentives for managers to run their
companies more efficiently); Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1989, at 61, 61–62 [hereinafter Jensen,
Eclipse] (arguing that private equity firms “resolv[e] the central weakness of
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firms’ corporate-governance structure enables them to manage
companies better through (1) creating strong financial incentives
for managers to improve company performance metrics;6 (2)
closely and actively monitoring management behavior; 7 and (3)
deploying deep industry, capital market, and financial expertise
in support of these mechanisms. 8 Taken together, these governing arrangements supposedly create a virtuous cycle of mutually
the large public corporation—the conflict between owners and managers over
the control and use of corporate resources” and, as a result, “mak[e] remarkable
gains in operating efficiency, employee productivity, and shareholder value”);
Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23
J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 121–22 (2009) (describing the changes in corporate governance that private equity firms institute in their portfolio companies and concluding that, on average, private equity activity creates economic value); Ronald
W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 219, 219 (2009) (arguing that a large part of private equity’s success is
“due to the corporate governance advantages of private equity over those of the
public corporation”); Joachim Heel & Conor Kehoe, Why Some Private Equity
Firms Do Better Than Others, MCKINSEY Q. (Feb. 2005), http://www.mckinsey
.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/why-some
-private-equity-firms-do-better-than-others (outlining the key governance
changes that private equity firms make to create value in their portfolio companies).
6. E.g., Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating
Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 250–51 (1989) (concluding that
the improvements in operating performance that portfolio companies experience after take-private transactions is caused by improved incentives for managers and, in particular, larger equity holdings by managers); Jensen, Agency
Costs, supra note 5 (arguing that the heavy debt loads carried by private equity
portfolio companies reduce incentives for opportunism by managers); Kaplan &
Strömberg, supra note 5, at 135 (arguing that managers of private equity portfolio companies face strong pressure to succeed by the knowledge that private
equity firms are quick to fire underperforming managers).
7. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 227–30 (noting that one source of
agency-cost reductions in private equity transactions is improved board monitoring of management); Francesca Cornelli & Ōguzhan Karakas, Private Equity
and Corporate Governance: Do LBOs Have More Effective Boards?, in 1 THE
GLOBALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS WORKING PAPERS VOLUME 1:
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2008, at 65, 68–73
(World Econ. Forum, 2008), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/pdf/WorldEconomic
ForumGlobalEconomicImpactOfPrivateEquity.pdf (finding that boards of private equity portfolio companies are smaller and meet more frequently after
take-private transactions).
8. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 132 (arguing that private
equity firms use their industry and operating knowledge to implement valueenhancing changes at their portfolio companies and hire outside experts when
they do not have the expertise internally); Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at
251–55 (noting that the high compensation offered by private equity firms allows private equity to attract directors with greater financial and industry-specific expertise). When this Article refers to private equity’s corporate-governance structure, it is intended that the reader will understand the term to include
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shared interests among sponsors, management, and ownership,
thereby incentivizing optimal corporate decision-making and the
maximization of overall equityholder wealth.
This conventional wisdom about the benefits of the private
equity corporate-governance model, however, overlooks the
many ways in which private equity in fact exacerbates conflicts
of interest between management and ownership. First, the compensation structure for private equity sponsors (that is, the private equity firm itself) creates a classic situation of moral hazard: sponsors capture much of the gain from any profits on their
investments, but are largely insulated from any losses. 9 The result is that private equity sponsors have financial incentives to
take excessive risk in their investment strategies. Second, limited-partner investors in private equity funds invest in these
funds under significantly less advantageous terms than typical
investors in public companies. 10 They have limited governance

the entire nexus of contracts that determine the way in which the private equity
firm and its related entities are governed. Thus, while some scholars have focused exclusively on the way that portfolio companies are run, and others have
focused exclusively on the way that private equity funds are run, this Article
intends to address the entirety of the private equity governance structure, from
investors to firms to funds to portfolio companies, in order to tease out the incentives and potential misalignments between these entities. For a full look at
the distinctions, see infra Part I.A below.
9. Moral hazard is most often described in the insurance context: when
individuals have purchased insurance (say, theft insurance) and know that they
will not bear the cost of any losses related to the insurance, they will be more
likely to take risks, or at least not to take steps to prevent the risks from materializing. See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON.
541, 541 (1979) (“Moral hazard refers here to the tendency of insurance protection to alter an individual’s motive to prevent loss.”). But the general phenomenon of moral hazard, that is, situations in which parties are incentivized to take
excessive risk because of their protection from losses, is seen in a wide range of
fields and industries. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 255–57 (2010) (banking industry); Ronald
J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 357–58 (2005) (merger agreements); Albert C.
Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 701–
07 (2013) (geoengineering and climate change); Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense
of Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 190–96 (2011) (executive
compensation).
10. The limited governance rights granted to investors in private equity
funds is all the more surprising given the aforementioned moral hazard problem
in private equity’s compensation structure. After all, one of the two traditional
responses to moral hazard is better observation of the risk-taker ’s actions (the
other being incomplete coverage of losses). See Shavell, supra note 9 (“Incomplete coverage gives an individual a motive to prevent loss by exposing him to
some financial risk; and observation of care also gives an individual a motive to
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rights, they have little access to information, and they have few
avenues for transferring or selling their equity interests in the
fund. 11 Finally, private equity funds treat investors differentially, often giving better terms to favored investors. 12 So, for example, an individual investor may enter into a side letter with a
private equity fund ensuring that the preferred investor pays
lower fees than other, less-favored investors. Or a private equity
fund may grant one investor a greater right to access information about company performance, or even a right to veto certain investments.
In sum, the private equity governance model creates a number of corporate-governance costs, these costs are endemic to the
private equity industry, and they are largely unrecognized as a
potential source of conflict between private equity firms and
their investors. This state of affairs presents a puzzle for traditional contract theories, under which agreements willingly entered into by arms-length parties should be expected to maximize joint wealth.13 In other words, if private equity’s governance
terms create such substantial harms for investors, why would
investors willingly agree to them, rather than negotiate for better terms or simply walk away?
This Article argues that the persistence of private equity’s
governance costs can be explained as a result of three related
phenomena. First, private equity’s structure benefits from
strong path-dependency effects that lock in the current structure
even in the face of changes in external markets. Second, private
equity investors face collective-action problems on multiple axes
prevent loss, as it allows the insurer to link to the perceived level of care either
the insurance premium or the amount of coverage paid in the event of a claim.”).
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. William Clayton, Preferential Treatment and the Rise of Individualized
Investing in Private Equity, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 249, 270–79 (describing the
varieties of preferential treatment granted to investors in private equity).
13. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (“ The corporation is a complex set
of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the participants to
select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities that are available in a large economy.”); Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd
Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 347 (1996) (“In the absence of information imperfections, corporate contracts are expected to maximize the joint wealth of the contracting parties.”); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE
L.J. 829, 832–34 (2003) (summarizing the basic conditions and limitations on
efficient contract theory).
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that inhibit cooperation between investors and encourage opportunistic behavior by private equity firms. Third, and finally, the
reputational constraints on private equity firm behavior have
been systematically overestimated as a tool for aligning the interests of firms and investors.
But these corporate-governance flaws in the private equity
model are not inevitable or, for that matter, unchangeable. A
number of potential solutions present themselves. One approach
is increased regulation of the private equity industry in order to
strengthen and better align the interests of private equity firms
and their investors. Another approach is increased cooperation
among institutional investors outside of the transactional context in order to reset governance and compliance norms and
overcome path-dependency problems. Yet another approach is a
greater role for independent information intermediaries, such as
ratings agencies or third-party consultants, who can step in to
help improve the quantity and quality of information provided
about private equity funds. It may well be that all of these approaches together are necessary in order to fully resolve the
structural problems inherent in the private equity corporategovernance structure.
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I provides a basic
background on the structure of private equity and survey the literature on private equity’s so-called governance dividend. Part
II sets forth private equity’s corporate-governance costs and explains the ways in which current structures create perverse incentives for risk-taking and opportunistic behavior by private
equity firms. Part III explains why these governance costs persist despite strong reasons for abandoning them. Part IV concludes by sketching out a set of potential reforms for reducing
private equity’s governance costs.
I. PRIVATE EQUITY’S GOVERNANCE DIVIDEND?
The private equity industry has seen dramatic growth over
the past decade. The number of active private equity firms has
increased by 143% since 2000.14 The amount of capital raised by
private equity firms has grown from $93 billion in 2003 to $527
billion in 2015. 15 Buyout funds are by now ubiquitous, and private equity acquisitions have become a mainstay on the front

14. Number of Active PE Firms Up, supra note 4.
15. BAIN & CO., supra note 4, at 2.
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page of the Wall Street Journal. 16 The compensation of private
equity managers has grown commensurately—Steve A.
Schwarzman of the Blackstone Group is estimated to have
earned $800 million in 2015, while Leon Black of Apollo Global
Management received $200 million.17
The tremendous growth in the private equity industry has
sparked a lively debate about the root causes of private equity’s
success. While critics have focused on its favorable tax treatment, 18 its shedding of costly pension plans, 19 and its heavy lobbying of state governments, 20 an increasing number of scholars
have argued that private equity’s primary appeal, and its greatest advantage, lies in its unique governance structure. 21
Through a careful admixture of industry expertise, large equity
stakes, and performance-based compensation packages, private
equity firms have crafted a superior governance model that has
brought superior returns to its investors over long periods of
time. 22 In other words, private equity’s growth is largely attributable to a governance dividend.
The evidence in support of the governance-dividend theory,
however, is decidedly mixed. While there is some evidence that
private equity firms institute changes that improve operational
metrics in their companies, it is unclear that these improvements lead to superior returns for investors. And in recent years,
performance has decreased, with private equity investments

16. E.g., Ryan Dezember, Blackstone Gains from Big Banks’ Pain, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 22, 2016, at A1; Ryan Dezember, Oil Bets Doom Texas Private-Equity
Fund, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2017, at A1; Matt Jarzemsky & Marie Beaudette,
The $8 Billion Buyout That Went from Bad to Worse, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2016,
at A1.
17. Ben Protess & Michael Corkery, Just How Much Do the Top Private
Equity Earners Make?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/business/dealbook/just-how-much-do-the-top-private
-equity-earners-make.html.
18. Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES
(July 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/29/business/yourmoney/
29view.html.
19. Elizabeth Lewis, A Bad Man’s Guide to Private Equity and Pensions 4–
5 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for Ethics, Working Paper No. 68, 2015), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2620320.
20. Ben Protess et al., How Private Equity Found Power and Profit in State
Capitols, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/07/15/business/dealbook/private-equity-influence-fortress-investment
-group.html.
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. Id.
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failing to outperform their benchmarks in several studies. 23 This
evidence raises questions about the accuracy of governance-dividend theories.
This Part proceeds in three Sections. First, Section A outlines the governance structure of private equity, highlighting in
particular the compensation structure for private equity firms.
Second, Section B discusses the potential benefits of private equity’s governance structure, with a focus on incentives, expertise, and monitoring. Finally, Section C presents the weak empirical evidence in support of the governance-dividend theory of
private equity.
A. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS
In order to understand private equity’s so-called governance
dividend, it may be useful to begin with a brief primer on the
typical structure of private equity investments. 24 This Article focuses on private equity buyout funds, which may be distinguished from other sorts of business models that may also be
termed private equity, such as venture capital firms or angel investors, or other sorts of investment strategies that private equity firms engage in, such as distressed debt investments or secondary investments. 25
Private equity firms are typically made up of small groups
of investment professionals, often with backgrounds in large investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan, who

23. See infra Part I.C.
24. It should be noted at the outset that any outline of the typical private
equity structure will by necessity not cover all the varieties of structures that
private equity firms utilize. As any private equity lawyer knows, every deal is
different, and so is every fund. However, this Section will attempt to provide a
broad overview of the key participants, governing documents, and legal entities
that are common to many private equity investments. For additional detail on
the structure of private equity transactions, see EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH (CEPR), A PRIMER ON PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK 9–20 (2012), http://www.cepr.net/documents/
publications/private-equity-2012-02.pdf; Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at
124–25.
25. For a discussion of distressed debt and secondary investments by private equity firms and, more generally, the proliferation of private equity strategies, see William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many?
Investment Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45 (2009).
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specialize in the acquisition, management, and sale of companies. 26 They tend to have few employees, low overhead, and minimal expenses. 27 While a few of the largest private equity firms
have gone public, listing their shares on domestic stock exchanges,28 most private equity firms are small private companies organized as partnerships or limited liability companies.29
Most private equity transactions follow a now well-established playbook. First, the private equity firm raises money from
a set of investors, typically large institutions such as university
endowments, pension plans, and sovereign wealth funds.30 Second, these investments are pooled into an investment vehicle
(the “private equity fund”). 31 The fund is generally organized as
a limited partnership, with the private equity firm serving as the
fund’s general partner and making day-to-day management decisions, and the investors serving as passive limited partners.32
Third, when the private equity firm identifies an appropriate
target company, the fund acquires the target (or “portfolio company”) using a mixture of the pooled investments from the investors and a substantial amount of debt from lenders. 33 As a result
of the acquisition, the portfolio company becomes a highly-leveraged, wholly-owned subsidiary of the private equity fund.34
While the portfolio company will often retain its executive officers, it will also enter into a management agreement with the private equity firm, pursuant to which it will pay certain fees to the
firm in return for management services.35 Finally, after a period
of time, the fund will exit its investment, either by selling the
26. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 121 (distinguishing private
equity firms from venture capital firms); Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 61
(finding large institutions are the primary owners of private debt).
27. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 121.
28. E.g., Lloyd L. Drury, III, Publicly Held Private Equity Firms and the
Rejection of Law as a Governance Device, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 57, 66–67 (2013)
(discussing “Blackstone Group, one of the first private equity firms to sell shares
to the public”); Gregory Zuckerman, For Private-Equity Clients, Worries Over
Public Listing, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304231204576406052688509710 (listing Apollo Global
Management LLC and KKR & Co., which has already gone public, as well as a
slew of additional firms on the verge).
29. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 123 (describing private equity
firms).
30. Id. at 123–24 (describing private equity funds).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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company to another buyer or taking it public through an initial
public offering. 36 The private equity firm will be entitled to a certain percentage of the profits from the sale (the “carried interest,” often equal to twenty percent of the profits), while the investors will be entitled to the remainder. 37 Figure 1 below
illustrates a simplified organizational chart of this structure.
Figure 1: Private Equity Governance Structure

Private Equity Firm

Investors
(Endowments, Pension
Plans, Sovereign Wealth
Funds)

Private Equity Fund

Portfolio Company

A few key features of the private equity structure are important to note. First, while the acquired company is formally
owned by the private equity fund, which owns all of the outstanding equity in the company, the ultimate owners are the private equity firm itself and its investors. 38 The respective rights
36. This, at least, is the intended outcome. In fact, many investments are
difficult to exit, as demonstrated by the increasing proliferation of so-called zombie funds that are unwilling or unable to sell their underlying portfolio companies and that therefore continue in existence. See Zombies at the Gates: The
Funds that Will Not Die, ECONOMIST (Mar. 23, 2013), https://www.economist
.com/news/finance-and-economics/21574043-funds-will-not-die-zombies-gates.
37. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 124.
38. The portfolio company typically has the private equity fund as its sole
shareholder or member, but the private equity fund itself will have a general
partner and a number of limited partners that, together, own all of the equity
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and obligations of the private equity firm and the investors are
set out in the fund’s limited partnership agreement, which will
typically include provisions on voting rights, access to information, and transfer restrictions.39 Second, the private equity
firm receives compensation in two forms: first, through ongoing
monitoring and management fees; and second, through a carried
interest, which entitles the firm to share in a portion of the profits from the sale of the portfolio company (the fabled “2 and
20”). 40 The compensation arrangements for private equity firms
will be discussed in greater depth in Part II.A.
Finally, the simplified model of the private equity structure
presented in Figure 1 leaves out two important complicating factors. Most private equity firms create more than one fund, and
each fund typically acquires more than one portfolio company. 41
This strategy allows the firm to deploy more capital, from a more
diversified investor group, and across a broader array of industries.42 However, as one can imagine, the organizational charts
for such entities quickly become unwieldy, with intricate ownership tracks and overlapping interests, and can be a potential
source of misaligned interests, as will be discussed in Part III.B.
Now that we have a basic understanding of the private equity governance model, we can turn to the arguments about private equity’s governance dividend.
B. STANDARD VIEWS OF PRIVATE EQUITY’S GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURE
It is a widespread belief that private equity’s primary appeal, and its greatest advantage, lies in its unique governance
interests in the fund. Therefore, the ultimate owners of the portfolio company
are the private equity firm and its investors. Of course, the private equity firm
and the limited partners typically are not natural persons, and thus the ownership chain could be traced even further, but for the purposes of this Article,
discussion will be limited to the firm and its investors.
39. Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259,
275 (2010) (discussing the contract design of limited partnership agreements).
40. For a detailed analysis of the breakdown of fees and carried interest
received by private equity firms, see David T. Robinson & Berk A. Sensoy, Do
Private Equity Fund Managers Earn Their Fees? Compensation, Ownership,
and Cash Flow Performance, 26 REV. FINANC. STUD. 2760, 2761–62 (2013).
41. Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 115, 121–24 (2013) (“A private equity firm manages one or
more private equity funds at once, and each such fund typically holds several
companies at once.”).
42. For a discussion about the problems associated with this approach, see
infra Part III.B.
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structure.43 According to this view, private equity provides a particularly beneficial form of corporate governance for companies,
one that compares favorably to other corporate forms. Through
concentrated ownership stakes, active monitoring, and high leverage, private equity firms make use of a number of tools and
incentives to reduce the traditional agency costs between management and ownership.44 The resulting governance dividend allows private equity firms to improve company performance and
realize benefits for investors and firms alike.
While proponents of the governance-dividend theory describe the problem from a number of different perspectives, underlying all of these perspectives is a basic dilemma in corporate
law—the ownership-management divide. 45 The concept is simple: the managers of a company have different, and oftentimes
conflicting, incentives from those of owners. The owners, who by
definition own the equity interests in the company, have an interest in maximizing the overall equity value of the company, 46
while the managers have an interest in doing a variety of other
43. See, e.g., RIBSTEIN, supra note 5; Davis, supra note 5, at 85–88 (explaining a better governance is created when there is more contact between equity
owners and management); Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 5, 328–29 (“ This
process results in a complete rethinking of the organization’s strategy and its
structure.”); Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 62 (arguing that private equity
resolves the struggle between owners and managers); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 130–32 (describing three changes private equity firms make to
investments after purchase); Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, 241–51 (listing
benefits associated with this form of governance); Heel & Kehoe, supra note 5
(explaining changes of governance used to create value in private equity firms’
portfolio companies); see also, e.g., Cornelli & Karakas, supra note 7 (exploring
positive effects of smaller, more active boards of directors in private equity).
44. See Michael C. Jensen, The Economic Case for Private Equity (and
Some Concerns) 3 (Nov. 27, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=963530 (arguing
that the structure of private equity “enables the capture of value destroyed by
agency problems in public firms—especially failures in governance”).
45. It should be noted at the outset that there is some confusion as to who
precisely should be considered the management of portfolio companies. In one
sense, it is the executives at the portfolio-company level, who, after all, are responsible for most day-to-day decisions at the company. But, it is also the private equity firm itself, which typically is paid a management fee and is actively
involved in portfolio company’s decisions. Thus private equity is a kind of hybrid
where the management-ownership divide is more fluid and ambiguous than one
would typically find at a large public corporation. For the classic description of
this dilemma, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 220–32 (1933).
46. Of course, the owners among themselves may also have differing interests. See Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1557–66 (2015) (arguing that both short-term shareholders and long-term shareholders may, in certain circumstances, benefit from
value-destroying behavior by managers).
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things that may destroy that value—for example, maximizing
their compensation, entrenching themselves in their positions,
or building empires. 47 These agency costs can be pronounced,
particularly in a world of public companies owned by dispersed
shareholders facing severe collective-action problems. 48
How, then, does private equity resolve this dilemma? According to proponents of the governance-dividend theory, private
equity reduces agency costs through three mechanisms: (1) better incentives; (2) better monitoring; and (3) better expertise.49
First, private equity firms strongly incentivize management
to run their portfolio companies in ways that maximize equityholder wealth. They do so by: (1) compensating managers at
the portfolio companies with large equity stakes in their companies, so that managers will have a strong financial incentive to
improve the company’s performance;50 (2) leveraging companies
with large amounts of debt, so that managers will have little excess cash flow available for inefficient or wasteful projects;51 and
(3) quickly and frequently replacing officers that underperform,
thereby reducing the ability of managers to entrench themselves
and keeping constant pressure on managers to pursue valuemaximizing business strategies. 52 These governance mechanisms reduce agency costs within private equity companies by

47. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
308–09 (1976) (proposing a theory of firm ownership to explain managerial
choices that end up lowering overall firm value).
48. Marco Becht et al., Corporate Law and Governance, in HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 829, 833–34 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
2007).
49. The use of the comparative here raises an obvious question: Better than
what? The short answer is publicly listed corporations. Most commentators
have compared private equity’s governance structure with that of the typical
publicly-listed corporation. See, e.g., Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 219
(“We claim that one major reason for this success is due to the corporate governance advantages of private equity over those of the public corporation.”). Of
course, private equity firms are not limited to buying public companies, and
they often do buy other forms of company, including privately held partnerships,
corporations, and limited liability companies.
50. Kaplan, supra note 6, at 244–46.
51. Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 5, at 324. The large amount of debt
also magnifies the compensation incentives faced by managers: managers will
be able to capture a greater percentage of the gains from improved firm performance. See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 228.
52. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 131 (“Leverage creates pressure
on managers not to waste money, because they must make interest and principal payments.”).
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aligning the interests of managers and owners and minimizing
incentives for shirking.
Second, private equity firms do a particularly good job of
monitoring management, both directly and indirectly. By concentrating ownership into a single blockholder (the private equity fund), private equity overcomes the typical free rider problems that bedevil public corporations with dispersed
shareholders. 53 The private equity fund, unlike a small investor
in a public company, has both the financial interest and the industry expertise to closely monitor the behavior of managers,
and is a particularly active monitor at that. 54 In addition, the
large amount of debt placed on portfolio companies serves as a
kind of indirect monitor, disciplining managers to focus on cash
flow and firm value. 55 A further side effect of debt financing is
that it brings another monitor into the game, namely, debtholders. 56 The debtholders of portfolio companies are typically large,
sophisticated financial institutions, and, given the extreme leverage of most private equity transactions, have strong incentives
to monitor risky behavior by managers. 57 This combination of
strong direct and indirect monitoring of management behavior
reduces information asymmetries and prevents value-destroying
actions by managers.
Finally, some commentators argue that private equity’s governance dividend stems from its smarter use of expertise. 58 In
this view, the private equity model benefits from, and indeed is
centered around, the gathering and deployment of expertise—
financial, operational, and industrial. Private equity firms specialize in particular sectors (such as technology, health care, or
consumer products), and they utilize their substantial experi-

53. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 228–29.
54. See Cornelli & Karakas, supra note 7 (finding that the boards of private
equity companies are smaller and meet more frequently).
55. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 131 (describing leverage as a
key ingredient to private equity governance).
56. Id.
57. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 247.
58. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 132 (“Private equity firms
use their industry and operating knowledge to identify attractive investments,
to develop value creation plans for those investments, and to implement the
value creation plans.”); Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 223 (“ The general
partners act as advisors to the portfolio company’s management and as members of the company’s board of directors, and draw on their expertise in corporate restructurings and their contacts throughout the industry to assist in creating value.”).
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ence from other transactions to maximize the value of their portfolio companies.59 They supplement this expertise by hiring professionals with operational backgrounds in the industry and retaining outside consulting groups.60 Since private equity firms
control the boards of their portfolio companies, they can easily
add directors to fill specific gaps in expertise, and they can compensate these board members highly. 61 Experts are often more
willing to serve on the boards of private equity companies than
on the boards of public companies because of the smaller risk of
litigation and the lighter regulatory burdens. 62
In sum, an increasing number of scholars have argued that
private equity has a corporate-governance advantage over other
forms of business organization, and in particular over the public
company. They identify this advantage as primarily a question
of reducing agency costs between management and ownership.
Through concentrated ownership stakes, high leverage, and financial and operational expertise, private equity has discovered
a particularly potent form of interest alignment, one that both
overcomes the collective-action problems inherent in dispersedownership models and incentivizes the key parties to pursue
value-maximizing business strategies.
C. EVIDENCE OF PRIVATE EQUITY’S GOVERNANCE DIVIDEND
Does private equity’s governance model create value? This
is a difficult question to answer empirically, as it requires reliable and representative data on private equity performance and
a reasonable set of comparable benchmarks from other companies. Because private equity companies are not subject to comprehensive public-company disclosure regulations, information
about their performance is difficult to come by, and firms have

59. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 126–28.
60. Id.
61. See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 254 (“Another important element of effective board monitoring is the extent to which board members are
given greater access to proprietary information in these private-equity firms,
which can include more frequent and specialized financial reports.”).
62. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1055, 1059 (2006) (“ Too much fear of liability, therefore, may reduce rather than enhance the quality of board decisions.”); Davis, supra note 5, at 84–
85 (listing advantages of going private); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside
Directors As a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 898, 912–17 (1996) (explaining the managerial-hegemony theory
behind boards of directors).
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incentives to disclose favorable information while concealing unfavorable information, thus skewing the data.63 However, in recent years, a number of scholars have attempted to overcome
these issues and test private equity’s performance against
benchmark companies, relying on information from industry
sources, voluntary self-reporting from private equity firms and
investors, and commercial data-collection companies. 64
First, from an operational standpoint, several studies have
indicated that private equity’s portfolio companies tend to improve across a number of performance metrics post-buyout. They
demonstrate improved productivity, 65 better profit margins, 66
greater return on sales,67 and higher earnings-to-sales ratios. 68
On the other hand, some scholars have expressed doubt about
whether these results are in fact caused by any changes that private equity firms enact, suggesting instead that private equity
firms tend to target companies that have underperformed in recent years and thus benefit from a reversion to the mean.69 When
compared to similarly underperforming firms that did not experience buyouts, private equity portfolio companies experience
smaller, or indeed no, operational improvements.70 Thus it is unclear to what extent private equity firms improve the operational
performance of their portfolio companies, although the weight of
the studies appear to conclude that the effect is generally positive.

63. See Robert S. Harris et al., Private Equity Performance: What Do We
Know?, 69 J. FIN. 1851, 1851 (2014) (stating that uncertainty about private equity performance is driven by “uneven disclosure of [private equity] returns and
questions about the quality of data available for research”).
64. Id. at 1855–56.
65. Davis et al., supra note 2, at 3959.
66. Id.
67. Jonathan B. Cohn & Erin M. Towery, The Determinants and Consequences of Private Equity Buyouts of Private Firms: Evidence from U.S. Corporate Tax Returns 2 (Working Paper, 2013), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
372c/0d57744ed92af63622074d86407773c2faa6.pdf.
68. Shourun Guo et al., Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?, 66 J. FIN. 479, 481
(2011).
69. See Jonathan B. Cohn et al., The Evolution of Capital Structure and
Operating Performance after Leveraged Buyouts: Evidence from U.S. Corporate
Tax Returns, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 469, 470 (2014) (concluding “our operating performance results appear inconsistent with the view that [leveraged buyouts]
lead to improvements in operating performance, either through the disciplining
effects of leverage and concentrated ownership, or through operational expertise supplied by private equity acquirers” (citations omitted)).
70. Id.
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Operational improvements, however, do not necessarily lead
to improved returns for investors, and another set of studies
have focused on this question, with similarly mixed results. A
number of studies in the 2000s and early 2010s concluded that
private equity outperformed its benchmarks and created economic value for investors. 71 These studies focused on what a limited-partner investor in a private equity fund would have
earned, net of fees, compared to a public market equivalent,
which is what the investor would have earned if it had invested
the same amount of money in the market (typically measured by
an index based on the S&P 500). 72 Most of these studies were
largely positive about private equity’s performance, finding excess returns to investors of between three and eight percent per
year over public market equivalents. 73
In recent years, however, studies have shown significantly
smaller returns for private equity funds. 74 One study from 2015
concluded that the median return for liquidated private equity
funds was nine percent higher than S&P 500 public market
equivalents over the life of the fund, which, assuming a fund life
of ten years, equates to an average annual outperformance of
only 0.87%. 75 When assessed against comparable companies that
71. See Harris et al., supra note 63, at 1852 (finding that “average U.S.
buyout fund returns have exceeded those of public markets for most vintages
since 1984”); Chris Higson & Rüdiger Stucke, The Performance of Private Equity
2 (Working Paper, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009067 (finding that U.S.
private equity funds with vintage years from 1980 to 2008 outperformed the
S&P 500 by over five hundred basis points per annum as of June 2010); David
T. Robinson & Berk A. Sensoy, Private Equity in the 21st Century: Liquidity,
Cash Flows, and Performance from 1984–2010, at 2 (Working Paper, 2011),
http://efa2011.efa-online.org/fisher.osu.edu/blogs/efa2011/files/FIE_2_1.pdf
(finding that private equity buyout funds outperformed the S&P 500 on a netof-fee basis in every vintage year since 1992).
72. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 63.
73. See id. at 1863 (finding median excess returns of 3.4% over the S&P
500); Alexander Ljungqvist & Matthew P. Richardson, The Cash Flow, Return,
and Risk Characteristics of Private Equity 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 03-001, 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=369600 (finding average excess returns of 8.06% and median excess returns of 6.04% over the S&P
500).
74. E.g. Ludovic Phalippou, Performance of Buyout Funds Revisited?,
18 REV. FIN. 189, 215–16 (2014) (finding that the average buyout fund underperforms by 3.1% when benchmarked to a leveraged small-value index).
75. EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, ARE LOWER PRIVATE EQUITY RETURNS THE NEW NORMAL? 16 (2016),
http://cepr.net/publications/reports/are-lower-private-equity-returns-the-new
-normal; David T. Robinson & Berk A. Sensoy, Cyclicality, Performance Measurement, and Cash Flow Liquidity in Private Equity, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 521, 526
(2016).
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more closely matched the characteristics of the funds, even this
minimal outperformance disappeared: the median return for liquidated private equity funds exactly matched that of targeted
public market equivalents. 76 Another 2015 study, using information provided by institutional investors in private equity
funds, concluded that, while private equity fund returns exceeded those from public markets in earlier years, since 2006
their performance was roughly equal to that of public markets. 77
Finally, yet another study, focusing on risk-adjusted performance of private equity funds, reached a largely similar result,
concluding that “[a]fter adjusting for appropriate risks, we found
no outperformance of buyout funds vis-à-vis their public market
equivalents on a dollar-weighted basis.” 78
Thus there appears to be some evidence that private equity
firms institute changes that improve revenue metrics and profitability in their companies. For many years, this appeared to
translate into superior returns for investors, as compared with
similar investments in broad public market indexes. However,
in recent years, evidence has mounted that private equity fails
to outperform its basic benchmarks of comparison. This result
calls into question the assertion that private equity’s governance
model is superior to that of the typical public corporation, suggesting that the corporate-governance dividend may well be
overstated. The following Section will examine these questions
by looking closer at the governance structure of private equity
investments in order to identify potentially unexamined governance costs.
II. GOVERNANCE COSTS OF PRIVATE EQUITY
Private equity presents a unique model of corporate governance. Structured neither as a large, publicly held corporation nor
a small, closely held company, private equity is instead something of a hybrid, drawing bits and pieces from both models in
order to create a sui generis entity. As described above, many
scholars have argued that private equity’s governance structure
is superior to other forms of corporate governance.79 In this view,

76. Robinson & Sensoy, supra note 75.
77. See Robert S. Harris et al., How Do Private Equity Investments Perform
Compared to Public Equity?, 14 J. INV. MGMT. 14, 15 (2016).
78. Jean-François L’Her et al., A Bottom-Up Approach to the Risk-Adjusted
Performance of the Buyout Fund Market, 72 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 36, 46 (2016).
79. See supra Part I.B.
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the private equity governance model resolves the most pernicious forms of misalignment between owners and management
and leads to better company performance and investor returns. 80
It may then come as a surprise that recent studies have shown
that private equity’s returns over the last decade have not exceeded those that would have been earned in a low-cost index
fund, particularly given the additional risks and lower liquidity
that are associated with private equity funds. 81
This Section will argue that the conventional view of private
equity’s governance dividend is flawed. Private equity’s governance structure, far from eliminating conflicts of interest and
moral hazard, exacerbates them. It does so in three ways. First,
private equity firms are compensated in ways that incentivize
them to engage in opportunistic and risky behavior to the detriment of investors. Second, private equity firms grant severely
restricted governance rights to limited-partner investors in their
funds. Third, private equity firms do not grant equal and nondiscriminatory treatment to all investors in the same fund, instead parceling out differential and advantageous treatment to
select favored investors. Put together, these governance mechanisms create a series of situations in which the interests of private equity firms diverge from those of their investors. 82
This Section will examine each of the three types of governance costs associated with private equity and provide a description of how prevalent these costs are in the industry. It will
sketch out some preliminary arguments about these categories
and discuss the factors that may heighten, or mitigate, their
costs in particular funds. It will argue that, in some cases, private equity’s governance structure causes individually rational
institutional actors to act in suboptimal ways over persistent periods of time.

80. Id.
81. See supra Part I.C.
82. To be clear, it is impossible to entirely eliminate agency costs in any
plausible scenario involving owners and managers of a company. Principals naturally have different interests than agents, and unless the principals exert complete control over all agent decision-making, misalignments will inevitably
arise. This Section, however, will attempt to highlight the primary areas of misalignment within the private equity corporate governance structure, assess the
severity of the misalignment, and describe the potentially harmful effects deriving from it.
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A. THE MORAL HAZARD OF PRIVATE EQUITY COMPENSATION
Many scholars have argued that one of private equity’s primary governance benefits is that it better aligns the compensation incentives of managers with the interests of owners. 83 Because the executive officers of portfolio companies invest more of
their money in their companies and are compensated with larger
equity stakes as compared with their counterparts at public companies, the argument goes, they have stronger incentives to pursue business strategies that contribute to long-term growth. 84
However, this focus on the incentives of management at the
portfolio company level overlooks the incentives of management
at the fund level. It is important to keep in mind that the private
equity governance structure has three levels of ownership:
(1) the portfolio company at the bottom; (2) the fund in the middle; and (3) the private equity firm and passive institutional investors at the top.85 While it is true that there are managers at
the portfolio company level, there are also managers at the fund
level. Each has separate incentives. Thus, a focus solely on the
incentives of executive teams at the portfolio company level,
without an understanding of the incentives of private equity
firms themselves, overlooks the fundamental role that private
equity firms play in company decision-making.
A closer look at the incentives of private equity firms reveals
a number of striking ways in which agency costs reinsert themselves into the process. Private equity firms are generally compensated in two ways. First, they receive annual management
fees, which entitle the firm to a percentage (often two percent) of
the capital that is committed by investors and/or the capital that
is employed by the fund. 86 Second, they receive a carried interest
in the fund, which entitles the firm to a specified percentage
(typically twenty percent, although this number can vary) of any
83. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 130–31; Kaplan, supra note
6, at 242; Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 251–52.
84. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 251–52.
85. See supra Part I.A.
86. Management fees are often structured so that, at the beginning of the
fund, the fee is based on the total amount of capital that investors have committed to invest, and, once the investment period has ended, the fee is based on the
actual invested capital. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 123–24. Private
equity firms may also receive a variety of other fees, including transaction fees
and monitoring fees, which can vary widely in their application and size, but a
full analysis and typology of these fees is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
fuller discussion of the various fees charged by private equity firms and their
contribution to firm profit, see Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2303, 2319–20 (2010).
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profits of the fund. 87 Each of these prongs—the management fee
and the carried interest—has agency costs embedded in its structure.
1. Management Fees

Even a cursory glance at the structure of management fees
charged by private equity firms reveals the agency costs inherent in the mechanism. A significant portion of private equity
firm compensation comes from management fees that are not
tied directly to the performance of the underlying companies.88
A recent study found that approximately two-thirds of a private
equity firm’s expected revenue from investments comes from
fixed-revenue components, 89 primarily management fees. Thus,
private equity firms earn a large proportion of their compensation regardless of how their investments turn out.
More importantly, the structure of management fees creates
a set of skewed incentives for private equity firms. Because management fees are based on total capital committed and total capital actually invested, private equity firms have strong incentives to (1) raise as much capital as possible, regardless of the
reasonable prospects for putting it to use, 90 and (2) invest as
much capital as possible, regardless of the expected performance
of the target companies.91 Both of these incentives create risks
for investors—in the form of money committed but unable to be

87. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 124; David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715, 716 (2008).
88. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 86, at 2305.
89. Id.
90. See KLAAS P. BAKS & LAWRENCE M. BENVENISTE, EMORY CTR. ALT.
INVS., ALIGNMENT OF INTEREST IN THE PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY 7 (2010),
http://goizueta.emory.edu/faculty/cai/documents/ECAI_Alignment.pdf; Martin
Steindl, The Alignment of Interests Between the General and the Limited Partner
in a Private Equity Fund—The Ultimate Governance Nut to Crack?, CORP. GOVERNANCE DEV. FRAMEWORK (Feb. 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp
-content/uploads/2013/02/The-Alignment-of-Interests-between-the-General
-and-the-Limited-Partner-in-a-Private-Equity-Fund__Full-Article-1.pdf.
91. See Dawei Fang, Dry Powder and Short Fuses: Private Equity Funds in
Emerging Markets 1 (Working Paper, 2015), http://www.gu.se/digitalAssets/
1539/1539613_fang-dry_powder_short_fuses.pdf (quoting a private equity manager as saying that, in the face of an impending investment period deadline, one
should “[j]ust spend the money in time and do not worry much about making
bad deals”); Becky Pritchard, Powder Stays Dry as Private Equity Struggles To
Spend, WALL ST. J.: PRIVATE EQUITY BEAT (July 21, 2015), https://blogs.wsj
.com/privateequity/2015/07/21/powder-stays-dry-as-private-equity-struggles
-to-spend (stating that “[i]f a private equity fund is not spending its money
quickly enough, it may have to return money to investors or delay fundraising
a new fund and that potentially means less money in management fees”).
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used or investments made but unable to be exited—and these
risks are not borne by the firm itself. While this risk may be mitigated by the fact that private equity firms benefit from increases in the value of their portfolio companies, and thus do not
have incentives to actively seek to destroy value, the majority of
the risk is borne by the other investors, while private equity
firms reap the gains from boosted management fees.
To illustrate this point, consider a private equity firm, which
we will call Empire Capital, that is nearing the end of its investment period. Let us assume that Empire Capital has raised a
fund of $1 billion, and its compensation arrangement is the typical combination of a twenty percent carried interest and a two
percent management fee. During the investment period, this
management fee will be calculated as a percentage of total committed capital (i.e., $1 billion), but after the investment period,
the base rate will change (or step down) to a percentage of capital
actually invested. For simplicity’s sake, let us assume that the
firm has not invested any of its capital yet and is down to a single
potential target company, Lemon Corp., which is currently on
the market for $1 billion. 92 The firm believes that Lemon Corp.
is a risky investment; there is a fifty percent chance that, at the
time of exit, the target will decline in value to $500 million, a
twenty-five percent chance that it will remain at $1 billion, and
a twenty-five percent chance that it will increase in value to $1.5
billion. 93 We will assume that the time between investment and
exit will be five years. 94
92. In reality, most private equity firms will consider many different potential targets, not just one, and analyze their respective strengths and weaknesses
before making an investment decision. All else equal, the firm should prefer
targets with greater profit potential. However, the presence of multiple potential targets can at best reduce the magnitude of the moral hazard problem, not
eliminate it. In addition, in the current environment where private equity firms
are sitting on substantial dry powder that must be invested, it is not unreasonable to assume that the universe of acceptable targets, compared to the available capital ready for investment, has shrunk. Indeed, many observers have come
to precisely this conclusion. See Private Equity: The Barbarian Establishment,
supra note 1.
93. These values are net of all taxes, fees and expenses.
94. Of course, for most private equity investments, the firm does not know
precisely when the exit will come—the decision depends on market conditions,
industry developments, and company-specific risks. A 2015 study found that the
average amount of time between an investment and an exit in the private equity
industry was 5.5 years. See Amy Or, Average Private Equity Hold Times Drop
to 5.5 Years, WALL ST. J.: PRIVATE EQUITY BEAT (June 10, 2015), https://blogs
.wsj.com/privateequity/2015/06/10/average-private-equity-hold-times-drop-to
-5-5-years. Therefore, for this example, we will assume that the exit will take
place in five years.
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The expected value of the Lemon Corp. investment is $875
million, 95 and thus a rational investor would not be willing to
pay $1 billion for it. But Empire Capital, importantly, does not
internalize the full costs and benefits of its investments. Instead,
it is paid based on two metrics: capital invested and profits. If it
does not invest in Lemon Corp., it will be obligated to return the
capital commitments and thus will earn neither management
fees nor any potential carry, an expected value of $0. If it does
invest in Lemon Corp., it will earn management fees for the fiveyear life of the investment (two percent of $1 billion for five
years, or $100 million) and also has a twenty-five percent chance
of earning carried interest on profits (twenty percent of the difference between $1.5 and $1 billion, or $100 million). Thus the
expected value of acquiring Lemon Corp. to Empire Capital is
$125 million. Despite the fact that the overall expected value of
the investment to all stakeholders is negative, acquiring Lemon
Corp. is a rational economic decision from the perspective of Empire Capital, given its compensation structure. If it does not acquire Lemon Corp., it will earn nothing, while if it does acquire
the company it can expect to earn $125 million.
As this simple example demonstrates, the structure of management fees creates a classic situation of moral hazard. 96 The
private equity firm captures much of the gain from a risky investment (it is guaranteed to earn its management fee, which
makes up the bulk of its expected earnings), and bears little, or
even none, of any consequent losses if the risk happens to materialize. The result is that private equity firms have strong incentives to take excessive risks in their investment decisions. This
incentive is particularly strong when the private equity firm is
nearing the end of its investment period and is sitting on dry
powder—capital that has been committed by investors but that
has not been invested—that it must either invest immediately
or return to investors. Indeed, in this example, even if Lemon
Corp. had zero chance of increasing in value, it would still be in
Empire Capital’s economic interest to acquire the company,
solely through its return on management fees.
To be sure, this example is simplified and does not take into
account the many variations in compensation that are found in
limited partnership agreements and side letters with investors.
95. Calculated as fifty percent of $500 million plus twenty-five percent of
$1 billion plus twenty-five percent of $1.5 billion.
96. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 334–37 (discussing the incentives associated with the existence of debt).
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One important interest-aligning mechanism in particular should
be noted. Private equity firms typically make equity investments
in their funds alongside their limited partner investors, and,
thus, they face some downside risk to bad investments. 97 The
amount invested varies, but is usually around one percent of the
total capital of the fund.98 In the extreme situation where all of
a fund’s portfolio companies decreased in value to $0, the private
equity firm would lose all of its equity investment in the fund.
However, the structure of private equity makes this interest-aligning mechanism a limited one. The amount invested by
private equity firms makes up a small percentage of the total
capital of the fund, and thus, there will always be a range of expected values in which the private equity firm will have an economic interest in making acquisitions that have net negative returns. So long as management fees remain a significant
component of compensation, this moral hazard will persist.
2. Carried Interest
Management fees, however, are not the sole source of compensation-based misalignment. The other important source of
compensation for private equity firms is carried interest. Carried
interest has been the subject of much debate in recent years,
much of it focused on the favorable tax treatment it receives under the U.S. tax code. 99 Less attention, however, has been focused on the powerful ways in which carried interest can create
incentives for excessive risk-taking by private equity firms.
As explained before, carried interest is a kind of performance-based compensation arrangement. Through its carried
interest, a private equity firm earns a specified percentage of its
fund’s profits, typically in the range of twenty percent. 100 Carried
97. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 123 (noting that the general
partner customarily provides a portion of the fund’s capital).
98. Id.
99. Critics have argued that carried interest, which is taxed at the low longterm capital gains rate of twenty percent under the current tax regime, should
instead qualify as regular income and therefore be taxed a top rate of nearly
forty percent. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership
Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008). Proponents of the
current, favorable tax treatment of carried interest argue instead that carried
interest is sweat equity much like any other interest in a company, and thus
rightly qualifies as capital gains. See, e.g., Steven B. Klinsky, The Carried Interest Loophole? What Loophole?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 15, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/business/dealbook/the-carried-interest
-loophole-what-loophole.html.
100. Weisbach, supra note 87, at 716.
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interest is often viewed as a way of properly aligning the interest
of private equity firms with their limited partner investors. 101
After all, investors commit their capital to private equity funds
in the expectation of profits, and they naturally want to incentivize private equity firms to pursue these profits.
But the equity interests held by investors and the carried
interests held by private equity firms differ in one important
way: the equity interests face downside risk, while the carried
interests do not. 102 If a portfolio company drops in value and thus
the private equity fund loses money, the equity investors in the
fund will bear that loss, but the carried interest will simply not
be triggered. Thus the private equity firm has upside potential
but no downside potential—at worst, its carried interest will be
equal to zero. 103 As with the management-fee arrangement, this
is a classic example of moral hazard.
To return to the example from earlier, let us assume that
Empire Capital has purchased Lemon Corp. for $1 billion. After
acquiring the company, Empire Capital discovers that its earlier
assessment of the range of expected values for Lemon Corp. is
incorrect. Instead, it now believes that it has a choice: it can either implement a radical restructuring of Lemon Corp., or it can
stay the course. If it stays the course, Lemon Corp. will remain
at a value of $1 billion at the time of exit. If it adopts the risky
restructuring, there is a fifty percent chance that Lemon Corp.
will drop in value to $400 million, and a fifty percent chance that
Lemon Corp. will increase in value to $1.4 billion.
The risky strategy has a negative expected value: if Empire
Capital adopts this strategy, its expected value will be $900 million, less than the value it could be guaranteed from simply staying the course. Thus the equity investors in the company would
prefer that Empire Capital not implement the risky restructuring of Lemon Corp.
101. See BAKS & BENVENISTE, supra note 90, at 3 (concluding that “[t]o preserve the improvements in interest alignment currently underway, the PE market would be served well if it would transition to a clearing mechanism in which
top performing GPs are rewarded with increased carried interest” with the goal
being to “de-emphasize management fees as a compensation channel for the
GP”).
102. See Weisbach, supra note 87, at 716 (noting that the firm earns a percentage of the profits earned by the fund).
103. Of course, private equity firms invest time and energy into their portfolio companies, so to the extent that they do not earn carried interest on their
investments, this is a loss in a certain sense (in the form of opportunity costs).
It is not, however, equivalent to the loss faced by equity investors, who ultimately receive back less capital than they contributed.
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But the economic interests of Empire Capital are different.
If Empire Capital stays the course, there will be no potential for
profit from the fund, and thus the private equity firm will not
realize any carried interest. If, instead, it adopts the risky strategy, there is a fifty percent chance that Lemon Corp. will increase in value to $1.4 billion, in which case it will earn twenty
percent of this profit through its carried interest in the fund. To
be sure, there is also a fifty percent chance that Lemon Corp. will
decrease in value, but this loss is not borne by Empire Capital
as its carried interest is effectively a profits interest, and thus
cannot drop below zero. Therefore, the expected value to Empire
Capital of implementing the strategy is positive (twenty percent
of the $400 million profit, or $80 million). The economic interest
of Empire Capital, then, is to adopt the risky strategy, even
though this strategy is, on average, value-destroying.
The carried interest element of private equity compensation
creates a moral hazard problem in the private equity industry
that in many ways mirrors the critiques leveled against the
banking industry after the financial crisis of 2008–2009.104 In
that crisis, many observers noted that bankers’ pay incentivized
excessive risk-taking—bankers stood to receive large bonuses if
they made risky, leveraged bets on the housing market, but were
insulated from any negative repercussions because their institutions were considered too big to fail. 105 Private equity firms face
similar incentives. They too have a financial interest in taking
excessive risks because they capture much of the upside (in a
typical structure, twenty percent of the profits of the investments) with little of the downside, as they will merely forfeit the
possibility of earning their carried interest while still pocketing
the ongoing management fees that they have been charging
throughout the investment period.
Another way of understanding the problem is to view the
carry as effectively an option. Options give their holders the

104. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9 (exploring how banks’ compensation structures produce incentives for excessive risk taking).
105. See DAVID F. LARCKER ET AL., FOLLOW THE MONEY: COMPENSATION,
RISK, AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES: 1–3 (Sept. 8,
2014), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer
-look-43-risk-compensation-financial-crisis.pdf (discussing incentives for bankers to engage in risky conduct).
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right to buy a share at a future date for a specified price. 106 Options are often viewed as a way to link pay with performance—
the options only have value if the stock price rises. 107 However,
it is increasingly recognized that options incentivize excessive
risk-taking among public-company executives and lead to measurable changes in a company’s risk profile.108 By basing executive compensation on increases in share prices, and making them
indifferent between different-sized decreases, stock options create financial incentives for executives to pursue risky strategies
that may have negative expected values. Carried interests create
similar, though perhaps less widely-recognized, incentives for
private equity firms to increase risk in their portfolio companies.
Many private equity funds attempt to minimize the misalignment created by carried interests through a mechanism
called a hurdle rate. 109 Hurdle rate provisions prevent private
equity firms from earning any carried interest until the limited
partners have realized a specified profit on their capital contributions. This number is commonly around eight percent, meaning that, until limited-partner investors have realized a return
of eight percent on their capital, the private equity firm earns no
carried interest. 110 Hurdle rates provide additional assurance to
limited-partner investors that they will realize a reasonable return on their investments before private equity firms earn their
carry, but, perversely, they also end up exacerbating the moral
106. See Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 31, 32 (1997) (discussing the use of stock option grants as compensation).
107. See Richard A. Booth, Why Stock Options Are the Best Form of Executive
Compensation (And How to Make Them Even Better), 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 281,
281 (2010) (arguing that options are the best way to align CEO and shareholder
incentives); Steve Cross, Keep Employees Incentivized, Align Pay with Performance from the Bottom Up, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2010), https://www.forbes.com/
2010/11/29/incentive-based-compensation-stock-options-markets-equity
-participation-incentivization.html#25b9929ba85e (discussing the productivity
benefits of employee stock options).
108. Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 432, 527–29 (George M. Constantinides
et al. eds., 2003); Carl R. Chen et al., Does Stock Option-Based Executive Compensation Induce Risk Taking? An Analysis of the Banking Industry, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 915, 943 (2006); see also Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., Managerial
Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 751, 751 (2002) (discussing the opportunity for rent extraction in executive compensation).
109. See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 86, at 2310 (discussing how carry
hurdles work in practice).
110. See id. at 2312 (using an eight percent hurdle rate in explaining how
hurdle requirements are applied).
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hazard problem. 111 Even with a hurdle provision, private equity
firms still do not face downside risk, but they now have an incentive to layer on additional risk in order to surpass the hurdle.
B. LIMITED GOVERNANCE RIGHTS FOR INVESTORS
The compensation structure of private equity presents a
moral hazard that misaligns the economic interests of private
equity firms and their investors, incentivizing risky strategies
and value-destroying behavior. Parties usually address these
types of moral hazard through enhanced monitoring of the relevant behavior. If the party with an incentive to misbehave knows
that bad acts will be identified and punished, he may refrain
from engaging in the behavior in the first place. But, as this Section will demonstrate, private equity is typified by severely limited governance rights for investors, reducing the ability of investors to monitor private-equity-firm behavior and thereby
exacerbating the moral hazard problem. 112
1. Lack of Voice
Investors in private equity funds have very little say in the
way that their funds are run.113 Unlike shareholders in public
corporations, who benefit from extensive voting rights on a variety of matters, 114 private equity investors have little or no ability
111. Larry Swedroe, Moral Hazard in Hedge Fund Fees, ETF.COM (Mar. 8,
2017), http://www.etf.com/sections/index-investor-corner/swedroe-moral
-hazard-hedge-fund-fees (“[ F ]eatures of . . . hurdle rate . . . provisions . . .
create an increased moral hazard . . .”).
112. For the classic description of the voice and exit problem in governance,
see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 1–20 (1970) (discussing each of these
governance problems).
113. John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1232 (2014) (noting that investment enterprises such as private equity funds tend to “radically
limit fund investors’ control”); Drury, supra note 28, at 60–62 (discussing investors’ governance rights in private equity firms). It should be noted at the outset
that many private equity firms argue that limitations on governance rights are
required in order to insulate limited partners from liability. After all, Delaware
law provides that a limited partner will not be liable for the obligations of the
partnership only for so long as they refrain from “participat[ing] in the control
of the business.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(a) (2017). But Delaware law
also provides an extensive list of actions that are expressly permitted for limited
partners, and this list is significantly broader than any rights granted to limited
partner investors in private equity. See id. at § 17-303(b).
114. Shareholders in public corporations typically have rights to vote on the
election of directors, mergers, acquisitions, and executive compensation pack-
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to participate in fund governance. Instead, they delegate nearcomplete control to private equity firms, which act as the general
partners of the fund. The limited-partner investors are restricted
to a short list of specifically enumerated voting rights, on such
matters as the amendment of the limited partnership agreement, the dissolution of the fund, or the removal of the general
partner.115 As mentioned earlier, the rights of investors in private equity funds are defined in the fund’s limited partnership
agreement and any side letters that the investors may negotiate
on their own.116 As such, investor rights are largely a creature of
contract law, and not state or federal law as one finds with publicly listed companies. 117
Of course, public corporations also have governing documents that lay out the respective rights and obligations of management and ownership, but there is a substantial public-law
overlay that limits and shapes how far public corporations can
go in restricting shareholder rights. These public company regulations do not, however, protect investors in private equity
funds.118 Instead, private equity investors only receive the benefits of the participation rights that they can explicitly negotiate
for prior to investment.
And it turns out that those rights are few and far between.
For example, investors typically have no right to vote on the sale
of portfolio companies, even if those companies form a substantial part of the fund’s assets. 119 That decision resides solely
within the discretion of the private equity firm. They typically
have no right to vote on the board of directors with managerial
ages, among other things. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 416–18 (2006) (discussing shareholder voting
rights).
115. See, e.g., DOUGLAS CUMMING & SOFIA JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL & PRIVATE EQUITY CONTRACTING app. 1, § 5.3 (2d ed. 2009) (providing a sample limited partnership agreement).
116. See supra Part I.A.
117. See Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law,
34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 476–77 (2009) (noting that non-corporations such as
private equity funds are “‘creatures of contract,’ representing a voluntary contractual relationship among private parties”).
118. It should be noted that some private equity firms are publicly listed and
thus would be subject to public-company regulation. Prominent examples include The Blackstone Group and KKR. See Drury, supra note 28, at 60 (discussing public offerings by these firms). These firms, however, remain in the minority.
119. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 5.3 (stating that the
manager has full power and authority to act on behalf of the partnership).
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authority reserved for the fund.120 Managerial authority is
vested in the private equity firm. They typically have no right to
vote on the compensation of executives.121 That decision also
rests with the private equity firm in its sole discretion. These are
all rights that, in some form or other, shareholders in public corporations are guaranteed, but that very few private equity investors have.
What rights investors do have in the governance of private
equity funds are typically rigorously circumscribed. One common voting right that investors do have is the right to remove
the private equity firm from its position as general partner of the
fund. 122 But that right is far from absolute. First, it typically
must be for cause, meaning that investors can only remove the
private equity firm if it misbehaves. This provision, on its face,
would seem an unobjectionable way of aligning the interests of
private equity firms and investors: the investors promise to keep
the firm in place as long as it acts in the interests of the investors, but have the power to remove it if it does not. But limited
partnership agreements commonly define cause so narrowly that
it can only be invoked in the most extreme cases, such as fraud,
willful misconduct, violations of law, felony convictions, or bad
faith.123 Some agreements go even further, requiring there to be
a final court determination confirming the general partner’s

120. Some private equity firms establish “limited partner advisory committees” that have certain limited rights to review the decisions of the general partner. See INSTITUTIONAL LTD. PARTNERS ASS’N, PRIVATE EQUITY PRINCIPLES 13–
15 (2d ed. 2011), https://ilpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ILPA-Private
-Equity-Principles-version-2.pdf (discussing attributes and best practices for
LPACs). But these committees typically have an advisory role and are focused
on vetting transactions that involve conflicts of interest for the private equity
firm. In addition, not all limited partners have the right to nominate their representatives to the committees; this right is often reserved for the few limited
partners with the largest commitments and who have explicitly negotiated for
such rights in their side letters.
121. See CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115 (detailing the authority of the
partnership manager); see also Robert J. Jackson, Private Equity and Executive
Compensation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 638, 668 (2013) (analyzing how executive compensation in companies owned by private equity firms differs from executive
compensation in public companies).
122. See Albert J. Hudec, Negotiating Private Equity Fund Terms: The Shifting Balance of Power, 19 BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 2010, at 48.
123. See Addison D. Braendel & Seth Chertok, Closed-End Private Equity
Funds: A Detailed Overview of Fund Business Terms, Part II, 13 J. PRIVATE
EQUITY 57, 68 (2010) (discussing how cause is usually defined).
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misbehavior before investors can remove the firm. 124 And, adding yet another obstacle, the voting threshold for invoking a forcause removal is often set at prohibitively high levels—as high
as eighty-five percent to ninety-five percent of the vote. 125
Put together, these restrictions and limitations effectively
eliminate the ability of private equity investors to voice their
opinions and participate in essential business decisions of the
funds that they own. Near total control is vested in the private
equity firm itself. This governance arrangement raises questions
about the proper alignment of interests between private equity
firms and their investors, and whether institutional investors
are adequately able to monitor and sanction private equity firm
behavior.
The inability of private equity investors to participate in
governance decisions might be less worrisome if they were protected by strong fiduciary duties. Indeed, the default rule in
many jurisdictions is that general partners owe the same fiduciary duties to limited partners that directors of corporations owe
to shareholders. 126 But many limited partnership agreements
require investors to waive any fiduciary duties that the private
equity firm might otherwise have, thus depriving private equity
investors of this judicial check on misbehavior. 127
Paradoxically, some scholars have argued that the inability
of investors to participate in governance decisions is one of the
primary benefits of the private equity model. 128 In this line of
thought, control of company decisions should reside in the hands
of the most efficient and knowledgeable decision-makers. 129 Because private equity firms have deep knowledge of the industries
124. Henry Riffe, General Partner Removal Provisions, TRIANGLE FUNDS,
https://trianglefunds.com/general-partner-removal-provisions (last visited Apr.
14, 2018).
125. See Hudec, supra note 122. Adding to the problem, the private equity
firm itself may own limited-partner interests that have a right to vote on these
matters, posing an obvious conflict of interest.
126. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2017); see also Larry E.
Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements, 37 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 927, 930–31 (2004) (arguing against fiduciary duty waiver restrictions for limited partnerships).
127. See de Fontenay, supra note 41, at 181 (noting that private equity firms
have “deliberately avoided” fiduciary duties toward their investors); see also
Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 25, at 51–53 (discussing the flexibility to
waive fiduciary duty under partnership law); Manesh, supra note 117 (noting
that noncorporations rely on contractual rather than fiduciary rights).
128. Morley, supra note 113.
129. Id. at 1232–33.
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in which they operate and the market conditions necessary for
their funds to profit, control most efficiently resides in their
hands, and not in those of institutional investors who have neither the will nor the ability to focus on day-to-day affairs at their
numerous investments. But this model only works when (1)
managers have strong performance incentives; and (2) investors
have strong exit rights. 130 Otherwise, the surrender of control
can operate as a license for rent extraction by the manager. But,
as already described in Part II.A, while the performance incentives for private equity firms may well be strong, they are not
perfectly aligned with the interests of investors. The next Section
will discuss the lack of exit rights for investors in private equity
funds.
2. Lack of Exit
Private equity investors lack a second important protection
against overreaching by private equity firms—the right to leave.
The right to leave, or exit, an investment is a particularly powerful method for disciplining the behavior of managers. 131 In a
public corporation, for example, if large numbers of shareholders
sell their shares, the value of the corporation’s shares will decline, reflecting poorly on the corporation’s management and
shrinking the value of management’s equity holdings. As long as
managers’ compensation is tied closely enough to the performance of the company’s share price, the threat of exit by large
shareholders can serve as a financial incentive for managers to
act in the interest of shareholders broadly. In other words, investors’ ability to exit a company may serve as an effective substitute for their ability to vote in the company.
Exit or the threat of exit, already a potent tool in disciplining
the managers of public corporations, could potentially be even
more powerful in the context of private equity, for at least two
reasons. First, private equity firms earn a substantial portion of
their compensation through management fees, which are calculated as a percentage of the total amount of capital that investors

130. Id.
131. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 25, at 53–54 (describing the
right to exit an investment as “essential for imposing discipline upon managers”); see also Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and
Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645, 2676–
77 (2009).
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have committed. 132 So, if investors were to withdraw their capital commitments, this reduction would directly affect the bottom
line for private equity firms through diminished management
fees. 133 Second, the other substantial portion of private equity
firm compensation is based on the firm’s carried interest, or profits from the sale of portfolio companies. 134 If it were to become
known that a number of large investors had sold their investments in the firm’s fund, this news could very well adversely affect the reputation of the firm and hinder efforts to entice buyers
or undertake an initial public offering for their portfolio companies. The difficulty of selling portfolio companies is a major concern for private equity firms and is one of the reasons for the
proliferation in recent years of so-called zombie funds, or funds
that have held their portfolio companies for longer than their
scheduled holding periods. 135
Despite the potentially powerful effects of exit as a method
for reducing agency costs in the private equity industry, investors in private equity funds have essentially no ability to sell
their investments in a timely way. Most limited partnership
agreements provide that limited partners may not transfer their
interests in the fund for the life of the fund (often ten to twelve
years) unless the general partner consents to the transfer. 136 As
a result, private equity firms can veto any efforts by investors to
sell their interests in the fund. Needless to say, private equity

132. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 86, at 2309.
133. Of course, after the investment period has ended, management fees typically switch to being calculated as capital actually invested. See supra Part
II.A.1.
134. See supra Part II.A.2.
135. See Jennifer Bollen, Zombie Private Equity Funds Sit on $127 Billion
Asset Pile, WALL ST. J. (July 31, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2015/
07/31/zombie-private-equity-funds-sit-on-127-billion-asset-pile.
136. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 9.2 (“No sale, assignment, transfer, exchange, pledge, encumbrance or other disposition . . . of all or
any part of the . . . Limited Partner ’s interest . . . in the Partnership . . . shall
be valid or effective without the prior written consent of the Manager. . . .”). Often, the decision of whether to consent to such a transfer resides in the sole
discretion of the private equity firm, thus allowing the private equity firm to
block transfers for any or no reason at all. To the extent that limited partners
negotiate for better transfer terms, these negotiations typically take place in the
context of side letters that apply solely to the specific limited partner requesting
the better terms, and not in the context of the wider limited partnership agreement itself. See James Gaden, Side Stepping Side Letters?, MAPLES & CALDER
(Mar. 19, 2013), https://www.maplesandcalder.com/news/article/side-stepping
-side-letters-483.
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firms’ power to veto transfers renders exit rights largely ineffectual and significantly impairs the potentially disciplining effects
of exit on management behavior. 137
It should be noted that exit is a controversial mechanism for
disciplining management behavior. Some scholars, for example,
have argued that greater liquidity actually impairs corporate
governance.138 By making it easier for investors to sell their investments, greater exit rights reduce the incentive for investors
to play a constructive role in the governance of those investments.139 Another reason for restricting exit rights is related to
the trade-off between short-term and long-term profits. The logic
here is that as executives become more attuned to share price
fluctuations, they spend less time focusing on the larger, more
important function of running the company for long-term
growth, and more focused on short-term, illusory bumps in share
prices.140 Indeed, the reaction against short-termism in public
137. Investors can generally withdraw their capital at the end of the term of
the fund. But a typical term for a private equity fund is ten years, and can sometimes extend for longer. See STEPHANIE R. BRESLOW & PHYLLIS A. SCHWARTZ,
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: FORMATION AND OPERATION § 2:18.1 (2011) (“A standard private equity term ends on the tenth anniversary of the final closing of the
sale of partnership interest by the fund. Thereafter, the general partner may
have the right to extend the term of the partnership for a stated period.”). This
means that investors can have their capital tied up for over a decade before they
have any ability to access it.
138. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investors as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991). Of course, another
reason for restricting the ability of investors to exit their investments in private
equity funds is that the fund’s investments are illiquid. Private equity funds
invest in whole companies, and thus they are not able to sell small portions of
their holdings to satisfy withdrawal requests in the ways that mutual funds and
hedge funds may. However, given the increasing demand for secondary market
sales of private equity interests, it is unclear that a complete prohibition on
sales of fund interests to willing third buyers is necessary or desirable. A robust
secondary market would promote the exchangeability of private equity interests
and could do a better job of holding firms accountable for their actions.
139. Id. at 1288–89. Exit and voice are often viewed as alternatives, with
voice serving as a substitute for exit. But in private equity, both of these avenues for cabining managerial discretion are sharply circumscribed.
140. See Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS.
LAW. 101, 104 (1979) (contrasting short-term perspectives of professional investors with long-term interests of shareholders and management); Martin Lipton
& Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea
Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 78 (2003); see also Sanjai Bhagat
& Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009) (recommending changes
to executive compensation structures that incentivize practices creating longterm value, rather than short-term price appreciation); William W. Bratton &
Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA.
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corporations has often been cited as a reason for corporations to
go private in the first place. For example, when Silver Lake Management teamed up with Michael Dell to buy Dell Inc. and take
the technology giant private, they stated as one of their primary
reasons the ability to make changes without concern for shortterm price fluctuations and fickle investor demands.141
Regardless of whether we believe that executives make better or worse decisions when investors have the ability to sell
their investments in the company, the strong transfer restrictions placed on investors in private equity mean that investors lack yet another basic method for protecting themselves
from management misbehavior. No matter what they think of a
private equity firm’s performance, exit is not an option.
3. Lack of Information
The private equity corporate-governance structure thus
lacks two important mechanisms for constraining managers and
reducing agency costs: voice and exit. But even if investors are
able to negotiate for greater voice and exit rights (a possibility
that will be discussed in the Part II.C), they lack the means to
exercise those rights effectively. This is because private equity
firms restrict the flow of information about the performance and
structure of their funds both to and among investors. 142 And
without comprehensive and timely information about their investment, private equity investors stand little chance of monitoring management behavior. 143
L. REV. 653, 696–703 (2010) (discussing information asymmetry between executives and the investing public and the effect on investing patterns). But see
Fried, supra note 46 (arguing that managers serving the interests of long-term
shareholders may generate less economic value over time than managers focusing on serving the interests of short-term shareholders).
141. Michael Dell, Going Private Is Paying Off for Dell, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24,
2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-dell-going-private-is-paying-off-for
-dell-1416872851.
142. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 11 (outlining the limited
information provided to limited partners).
143. In a recent review of the private equity industry, the SEC found that
“most limited partnership agreements do not provide limited partners with sufficient information rights to be able to adequately monitor not only their investments, but also the operations of their manager,” and that “[w]hile investors
typically conduct substantial due diligence before investing in a fund, . . . investor oversight is generally much more lax after closing.” Andrew J. Bowden, Dir.,
Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, SEC, Address at the Private
Equity International Private Fund Compliance Forum: Spreading Sunshine in
Private Equity (May 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014
--spch05062014ab.html.
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Investors in public corporations have access to extensive information about the companies that they own. Securities regulations require public companies to file annual reports (10-Ks),
quarterly reports (10-Qs), and additional reports upon the occurrence of certain key events (8-Ks). This information covers every
conceivable part of a company’s business: developments in operations; risk factors; properties; legal proceedings; financial data;
management discussion and analysis of financial conditions; executive compensation; related-party transactions; and other information. 144 Put together, these requirements give shareholders an extensive view into the nature and performance of their
company.
Private equity investors, on the other hand, do not receive
the same extensive disclosures about their investment. Typical
limited partnership agreements require private equity firms to
provide investors with only barebones information about the
fund: annual and quarterly reports that include a balance sheet,
profit and loss account, and summary of investments, as well as
information about investments bought and sold. 145 This information is not subject to the same rigorous standards of review
and liability that public-company disclosures are subject to, and
indeed the disclosure practices of private equity firms have been
the subject of SEC investigations in recent years.146 Some scholars have even argued that important aspects of the private equity structure today can only be explained as an attempt to escape the reach of antifraud rules under the securities laws. 147
But even the limited information disclosures that private
equity investors are entitled to come saddled with myriad caveats and carve outs.148 For example, some limited partnership
agreements go so far as to allow the private equity firm, in its
sole discretion, to deny limited partners any information that
144. See Form 10-K, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf
(last visited Apr. 14, 2018).
145. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 11 (providing an example of the limited information typically provided to limited partners).
146. See Gretchen Morgenson, The Deal’s Done. But Not the Fees., N.Y.
TIMES, at BU1, May 25, 2014 (discussing recent SEC investigations of private
equity firms).
147. See James C. Spindler, How Private Is Private Equity, and at What
Cost?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2009) (arguing that, for private equity,
“[s]taying below the regulatory radar is paramount”).
148. See Hudec, supra note 122, at 48 (“ Traditional limited partnership
agreements do not have expansive information rights and tricky confidentiality
obligations make robust information flow difficult to come by.”).
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might adversely affect the private equity firm. 149 In addition, investors are often prohibited from even learning about the identities, investment amounts, or investment terms of other investors. 150
Not only is the right to information prescribed, but the right
to share such information with others is similarly limited. 151
Limited partnership agreements often include confidentiality
provisions with sweeping restrictions on the disclosure to third
parties of a wide array of information that is considered confidential, including partnership terms, the identity of other limited partners, and side arrangements with the general partner. 152 These types of provisions prevent limited partners from
discussing business matters with other limited partners, effectively prohibiting the investors from cooperating.
Through these mechanisms, private equity firms have cut
the flow of information to investors down to a trickle. With such
limited information, investors find it difficult to detect and punish rent-seeking behavior by the private equity firm managers.
So even when investors succeed in negotiating for greater exit
and voice rights, a daunting task in itself, they struggle to exercise those rights effectively without better information about the
behavior and performance of the firm.
If there is any doubt about whether the information problem
is purely theoretical, consider the following fact: in the last few
years, several prominent private equity firms have been fined by
the SEC for improper disclosure and fee practices. 153 That list
149. See MARTIN I. LUBAROFF & PAUL M. ALTMAN, LUBAROFF & ALTMAN ON
DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 5-24 to -26 (2018).
150. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 15.5 (providing an example of confidentiality requirements often placed on limited partners).
151. The confidentiality of limited partnership agreements is a matter of
some controversy. Many private equity firms argue that the terms of their limited partnership agreements are a matter of competitive advantage, and any
disclosure outside the fund would damage the firm’s ability to invest and generate returns for investors. See Steve Judge, Confidentiality of Limited Partnership Agreements Is Paramount, PE HUB NETWORK (Nov. 3, 2014), https://
www.pehub.com/2014/11/confidentiality-of-limited-partnership-agreements-is
-paramount. But others have argued that these claims are overblown and that
the real reason for the extreme secrecy around limited partnership agreements
is that disclosing their tax and fee structures would subject private equity firms
to criticism. See Dan Primack, Private Equity’s False Argument for Confidentiality, FORTUNE (Nov. 25, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/11/25/private-equitys
-false-argument-for-document-secrecy.
152. See CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 11.
153. In 2016, Apollo Global Management paid a $53 million fine to the SEC
in order to settle allegations that it misled investors about its fees, improperly
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includes three of the four largest private equity firms in the
world: Apollo, Blackstone, and KKR. 154 The fourth, Carlyle, has
received a request from the SEC for additional information about
its fee practices. 155 This trend of improper disclosures by private
equity firms to the detriment of investors suggests that information flows are indeed problematic and, at the very least, must
be improved to prevent false or inaccurate disclosures.
C. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF INVESTORS
As the previous Sections have demonstrated, the structure
of private equity carries with it two important governance costs:
compensation-based moral hazard and inhibited governance
rights for investors, both of which exacerbate agency costs between investors and private equity firms. But one final governance cost of the private equity model not only increases the severity of these problems, but also introduces a separate
tension—intra-investor conflict. This is the increasingly common
strategy of granting different treatment to different investors. 156
It is a bedrock principle of corporate law that similarly situated shareholders should be treated similarly.157 This equal
accelerated the payment of such fees into lump-sum payments, reduced the
amount available for distribution to fund investors, and failed to fully disclose
these practices to investors. See Ben Protess, Apollo Global Settles Securities
Case as the S.E.C. Issues $53 Million Fine, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2016, at B3. In
2015, Blackstone Group LP agreed to pay a $39 million fine in connection with
insufficient disclosures to investors about the fees it collected from the sale of
portfolio companies and discounts on legal fees that were not distributed out to
investors. See Lisa Beilfuss & Aruna Viswanatha, Blackstone in $39 Million
SEC Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
blackstone-settles-with-sec-over-certain-fee-practices-1444238653. Also in
2015, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. agreed to pay $30 million to settle allegations that it had improperly allocated excessive “broken-deal” costs to investor
funds. See Mark Maremont, KKR Agrees to $30 Million SEC Settlement, WALL
ST. J. (June 29, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kkr-settles-with-sec-for
-nearly-30-million-1435592880.
154. J.B. Maverick, World’s Top 10 Private Equity Firms, INVESTOPEDIA
(Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/011116/worlds
-top-10-private-equity-firms-apo-bx.asp (citing Apollo Global Management,
Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, and KKR & Co. as the four largest equity
firms).
155. Carlyle Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 24, 2016), at 35.
156. See generally Clayton, supra note 12.
157. See REINIER H. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 96 (3d ed. 2009) (“ The equal treatment of shares (and shareholders) of the same class is a fundamental norm of
corporate law.”); Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate
Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072, 1074 (1983) (stating
that it is a “part of the received learning about publicly held corporations” that
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treatment principle is incorporated in both federal 158 and state
law. 159 While certain exceptions exist, most obviously in the case
of common versus preferred shares, 160 most shareholders can assume that they are entitled to the same distributions and voting
rights as other holders of their class of shares. This principle of
equal treatment is motivated by concerns about entrenchment
and favoritism, and, more generally, the diversion of corporate
assets to majority or controlling shareholders at the expense of
other shareholders. In other words, the equal-treatment norm is
aimed at preventing value-reducing forms of opportunism by
managers and large shareholders.161
Private equity firms, however, are not bound by the same
norms of equal treatment and, indeed, often grant different and
more favorable treatment to certain investors in their funds. 162
While all investors sign the same limited partnership agreement—a document that purports to set forth the relative rights
and obligations of the partners—private equity firms also negotiate side letters with individual investors in their funds. 163
“all shares of a particular class (e.g., common stock) are to be treated as homogeneous claims on enterprise wealth”). But see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 110 (1991)
(stating that “[m]any scholars, though few courts, conclude that one aspect of
fiduciary duty is the equal treatment of investors”).
158. See SEC Equal Treatment of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10
(“No bidder shall make a tender offer unless: (1) The tender offer is open to all
security holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer; and (2) The
consideration paid to any security holder for securities tendered in the tender
offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security holder for securities
tendered in the tender offer.”).
159. See Odyssey Partners v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 406 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(concluding that “general principles of our law disfavor[ ] non-prorata distributions of corporate assets”); Stephenson v. Dreyer, 947 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Cal.
1997) (“Any use to which [majority shareholders] put the corporation or their
power to control the corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately
and must not conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation’s business.”).
160. Needless to say, corporations often have more than one class of shares,
and these shares may well have different voting and economic rights. In addition, Delaware law allows boards to discriminate between shareholders in the
use of poison pills in order to fend off threats to the corporation. See Moran v.
Household Int’l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
161. See James D. Cox, Equal Treatment for Shareholders, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 615, 615–16 (1997) (contrasting equal treatment of all shareholders with
“opportunistic” management practices).
162. See Clayton, supra note 12, at 252 (noting that “[p]referential treatment
of investors is more common than ever in [private equity], thanks to new structures that make it easier to grant different terms to different investors”).
163. See id. at 261 (discussing the prevalence of “customized contracting” in
private equity).
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These side letters can amend, supplement, or even contradict,
the terms that are provided in the limited partnership agreement. 164 Through the negotiation of these side letters, preferential treatment is often given to repeat investors or large institutional clients. 165
Common provisions in these side letters include lower fees
and expenses for individual investors, opt-out rights for proposed
investments in restricted industries, and greater control and
monitoring rights.166 Some side letters include so-called mostfavored-nation provisions, which require private equity firms to
give beneficiaries the benefit of any provision included in other
investors’ side letters, effectively ensuring that they receive any
preferential treatment granted to others. 167 Another common
provision allows institutional investors to co-invest in portfolio
companies, allowing these preferred investors to participate directly in deals originated by the private equity fund.168 Many of

164. Id. at 263–64.
165. See Marco DaRin & Ludovic Phalippou, There Is Something Special
About Large Investors: Evidence from a Survey of Private Equity Limited Partners 5 (TILEC, Discussion Paper No. 2014-010) (finding that a significantly
higher percentage of large investors receive side letters and other preferential
provisions than smaller investors); Barry Steinman, Private Equity Fund Fees,
DUANE MORRIS LLP PRESENTATION, at slide 7 (Aug. 2014), http://www
.duanemorris.com/site/static/private_equity_fund_fees.pdf (noting that large investors are often charged reduced management fees).
166. See Clayton, supra note 12, at 261–65.
167. Such most-favored-nation clauses are commonly commitment-based,
meaning that an investor only has the right to receive the benefits given to investors that have committed to invest similar or smaller amounts of capital. In
this way, smaller investors do not have the right to elect to receive the favorable
terms given to large investors. See ZACHARY K. BARNETT ET AL., MAYER BROWN,
MOST FAVORED NATIONS CLAUSES: POTENTIAL IMPACT ON SUBSCRIPTIONBACKED CREDIT FACILITIES 3 (2015), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/
Publication/fad2b171-3af5-4e21-8e0d-03a1b11d1ee2/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/3f05a730-9157-4777-af22-03d9306ea290/Most_
Favored_Nations_Clauses.pdf; Thomas Volet, Most-Favored-Nation Effects in
Private Equity: Uncertain, LAW360 (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.law360.com/
articles/625684/most-favored-nation-effects-in-private-equity-uncertain.
168. See Lily Fang et al., The Disintermediation of Financial Markets: Direct
Investing in Private Equity, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 160, 160 (2015) (discussing the
prevalence of co-investments among large institutional investors). Some of the
biggest beneficiaries of co-investment agreements are foreign investors, such as
sovereign wealth funds and pension plans. See Reuters, Private Equity Firms
Struck Hushed Deals with Foreign Funds, FORTUNE (Aug. 30, 2016), http://
fortune.com/2016/08/30/private-equity-hushed-deals-sec (identifying Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund GIC and the Canadian pension fund Canada Pension Plan Investment Board as beneficiaries of co-investment arrangements).
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these arrangements go undisclosed to other, less-preferred investors in the fund.169
Given the differential treatment of investors, it is not surprising that limited-partner investors in private equity receive
widely varying returns from their investments. One study found
that endowments, a group that is generally viewed as a preferred
investor by private equity firms, receive twenty-one percent
greater returns than the average return for all investors in private equity funds. 170 And even within the same fund, investors
can receive significantly different returns, based on management-fee discounts and rebates. 171
Side letters and other arrangements for differential treatment of investors thus raise the distinct possibility that fund assets will be diverted to preferred investors at the expense of nonpreferred investors. This possibility creates a fundamental
conflict between limited partners as they attempt to negotiate
the terms of their investment. Investors may be willing to accept
less favorable terms generally in the limited partnership agreement, as long as they can be assured that they will receive better
treatment individually in their side letters.
Perhaps even more importantly, in this age of indirect equity ownership, the prospect of preferential treatment for insider
investors minimizes, and may eliminate, the vital role that large,
sophisticated investors play as guardians of equityholder rights
in the governance process. 172 Activist investors have served as
important agents for change in the governance practices of public companies today, but they might well never have created this
change if managers had had the option of buying them off
through privately negotiated side-bargains. 173 Generally, large
169. See Reuters, supra note 168 (noting that failing to disclose preferred
terms to smaller investors may lead to scrutiny from the SEC).
170. Josh Lerner et al., Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The Limited
Partner Performance Puzzle, 62 J. FIN. 731, 733 (2007).
171. See Timothy Spangler, Deconstructing Management Fees in Alternative
Funds, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timothyspangler/
2014/08/19/deconstructing-management-fees-in-alternative-funds (“[I]nvestors
in the same fund can have materially different returns based on discounts obtained against fees.”).
172. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 47–49 (2012) (concluding
that the empirical evidence strongly supports the view that large blockholders
improve corporate governance and benefit investors).
173. The practice of greenmail, or purchasing a large block of shares and
then pressuring a board to buy those shares back at a premium or face a proxy
contest, has been roundly condemned and indeed has been the target of several
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equityholders have a greater incentive to monitor management
behavior than small equityholders because they will be able to
capture a greater percentage of the benefits from any changes.174
But if private equity firms can pay off large investors in return
for their looking the other way on marginally higher transaction
or monitoring fees, then the incentive for collectively desirable,
but individually costly, monitoring decreases.
The argument in favor of preferential treatment for certain
investors, of course, is that it allows for more customized pricing
and terms.175 Just as price discrimination by companies can lead
to more efficient results, contract discrimination by private equity can increase the scope and size of investments by prospective investors. 176 If a certain investor is prohibited from investing in payday-lending companies, then the private equity firm
can grant that investor an exemption from any such investments, without resorting to the extreme measure of entirely excluding the investor from the fund. These kinds of side agreements can improve efficiency and encourage value-creating
transactions between willing parties. Thus, where private equity
firms can discriminate between investors and charge them different prices, the result may be efficiency enhancing to the extent it allows more investors to participate in the market.
But the very existence of price discrimination in the private
equity market is evidence that the market is not functioning
properly. 177 It is a widely recognized axiom that where a market
is perfectly competitive (that is, good information exists about
the market, no barriers to entry prevent new firms from competing, and no other fundamental market failure is present), price
discrimination should not be able to exist, as individual firms
state laws effectively prohibiting the practice. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1707.043 (2008) (requiring disgorgement of profits from greenmail);
15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2571–76 (2008) (requiring disgorgement of profits acquired through greenmail).
174. Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that small investors free ride
the monitoring provided by large shareholders, gaining the benefits without
paying the costs. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 633 (2006).
175. See Clayton, supra note 12, at 155–57 (outlining the effects of offering
preferential terms for select investors).
176. See generally id. (suggesting that contract discrimination favors large
investors to begin with, and preferred terms may encourage larger and repeat
investments).
177. See Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2221 (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter
eds., 2007).
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have no ability to affect market prices. 178 The presence of price
discrimination, on the other hand, is strong evidence that disabling market failures (such as monopoly power or information
asymmetries) are present in an industry.179 Thus the fact that
private equity firms are discriminating between investors, favoring some over others, not only reveals a fundamental conflict
among investors, but also reveals that market failures have
skewed the industry in a way that benefits private equity firms
at the expense of investors.
III. PRIVATE EQUITY AS MARKET FAILURE
As the preceding Part demonstrates, private equity’s governance structure creates significant governance costs in the
form of compensation-based moral hazard, limited governance
rights, and differential treatment. This governance structure incentivizes excessive risk-taking by private equity firms, restricts
the ability of investors to monitor bad behavior, and creates intra-investor conflicts.
Given the extent of governance costs associated with the private equity structure, one might ask why investors put up with
it. After all, in a world of freedom of contract, one might expect
that investors would refuse to invest under these terms. Institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments are sophisticated parties with repeat exposure to the private equity industry. If they negotiate these terms into the governance
structure, or at least tacitly accept them, then perhaps we should
conclude that the resulting governance structure is an efficient
outcome. 180
This Part will argue that the market for private equity contracts is inefficient for several reasons. First, private equity
firms benefit from strong path-dependency effects that lock in
current structures. Second, investors face collective-action prob-

178. See id. at 2224 (outlining specific market conditions necessary for price
discrimination to be economically favorable for a firm); see also B. CURTIS
EATON & DIANE F. EATON, MICROECONOMICS 284 (1988) (explaining that price
discrimination is only possible for firms with “some degree of market power ”).
179. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in
Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 474 (2002) (“Under standard theories of
monopoly, with perfect information, firms would have an incentive to price discriminate perfectly (extracting the full consumer surplus from each [consumer]).”).
180. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 347 (discussing an “abstract
belief that markets for corporate contract terms work efficiently”).
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lems that inhibit cooperation. And finally, reputational constraints on private equity firms are not as powerful as many observers have assumed.
A. PATH DEPENDENCE
Under traditional economic theory, parties are expected to
negotiate contracts that maximize the joint wealth of the parties,
absent transaction costs. 181 No rational party would reject a contractual term that creates value as long as it can capture some
portion of the surplus value. So, while specific contractual provisions may benefit one side or the other, overall the nexus of contracts should be expected to be efficient and value-creating. As
such, one might presume that the private equity governance
structure—which, after all, involves sophisticated parties willing to invest substantial time and money into negotiating their
investments—would come close to this ideal of efficient bargaining and optimal contracts.
But the efficient-bargaining hypothesis is based on certain
assumptions about the nature of the contracts involved and the
rationality of the actors that negotiate them. One important exception to its validity, and the focus of this Subsection, is the
concept of path dependence. Path dependence refers generally to
the idea that allocations or arrangements today are conditioned
on past decisions.182 The paradigmatic example of path dependence is the QWERTY keyboard. 183 It was first designed as a way
of preventing excessive jamming on typewriters, but once
enough manufacturers had adopted the keyboard layout and
enough typists had become proficient in using it, the costs of
switching to another layout became excessively high. 184 Typists,
who had invested time and money learning how to type quickly
and efficiently on the QWERTY keyboard, were leery of buying
181. See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and
Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116, 118 (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000) (applying rational choice theory to argue that “contracting parties are
assumed to compare the expected financial costs and benefits of alternative contract terms and to base their preference on which term will provide the greatest
differential of benefits over costs”).
182. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In,
and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 210 (1995) (“ The use of path dependence
in economics is [premised on the concept that allocations] . . . exhibit memory;
they are conditioned on past decisions.”).
183. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AMER.
ECON. REV. 332 (1985).
184. Id. at 333–36.
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keyboards that had different layouts, even when the initial rationale for the creation of the QWERTY keyboard (typewriters
that jammed) ceased to exist. 185 In essence, what was a historical
accident became locked in by the initial choice of many manufacturers to adopt, and, thus, many typists to learn, the QWERTY
keyboard.186 Today, the QWERTY keyboard is still dominant,
even in an era of smartphones that never jam. 187
Contract terms also exhibit path dependence.188 Although
perhaps not as vivid an example as QWERTY keyboards, standardized contract terms can benefit from increasing returns as
more parties adopt the terms, and also entail switching costs
once they are widely employed in an industry. For example, if a
particular provision has been blessed by the courts as enforceable, or has a widely known interpretation in the industry, then
adopting that term provides a level of certainty that may override concerns about whether the term is, in the abstract, the optimal language for the parties in any particular instance. Similarly, the cost of reimagining and drafting contracts from scratch
is substantially higher than merely using a precedent from a
past deal. Standardized terms also benefit from the fact that
many parties have scrutinized the terms, thereby reducing the
room for errors or oversights in drafting contracts. 189
The key point here is that a contractual structure that is
adopted at an initial time period can persist into future time periods, even if that contractual structure would not be the optimal
structure for parties today if they were drafting from a tabula
rasa. It could well be rational for parties to remain with the initial contractual structure because it provides certain ancillary
benefits—often referred to as learning or network benefits—that
the otherwise optimal, but new, structure does not. In other
185. Id. at 334–35.
186. Id. at 335–36. Some scholars have questioned whether QWERTY keyboards provide a real-life application of path dependence, calling into doubt a
number of elements of the story told above. See Stephen E. Margolis & S. J.
Liebowitz, Path Dependence, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 17, 17 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
187. See The QWERTY Myth, ECONOMIST (Apr. 1, 1999), http://www
.economist.com/node/196071 (noting that once a typist has “learned to type on a
QWERTY keyboard, the cost of retraining . . . is not worth paying”).
188. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 348 (“[C]orporate contract
terms can frequently offer ‘increasing returns’ as more firms employ the same
contract term.”); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127
(1999).
189. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 350.
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words, the ancillary benefits of staying the course with a previous contract structure may outweigh any benefits from switching to a better contract structure.
Private equity governance structures exhibit many of the
features we would expect to see if the industry were subject to
strong path-dependence effects. The governance structure of private equity firms demonstrates a surprising level of conformity
on certain key terms, like the 2 and 20 compensation structure,
and survived largely intact even after external shocks like the
2008 financial crisis that forced many other alternative investment managers to radically rethink their business models. 190
The level of complexity of private equity contracts is high, thus
increasing the costs of switching to new, untested contractual
structures. 191 The difficulty of restructuring these arrangements
would involve extensive time and resources and would be subject
to great uncertainty. 192
But it is important to note that the path dependence of private equity’s governance structure does not depend solely on the
increasing returns from standardization or the heavy switching
costs. There are also deep behavioral reasons for individual actors to continue with these past arrangements even in the face
of evidence that the arrangements are no longer optimal.193
First, individuals concerned with their reputations have
strong incentives to imitate the prior decisions of others in the
field, a phenomenon called herd behavior. 194 Both private equity
managers and employees of institutional investors that are
190. Chris Flood, Private Equity Clings to “2 and 20” Fee Model, FIN. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/f7dc242c-58a9-11e6-9f70
-badea1b336d4.
191. See David E. Hutchison, Understanding and Teaching Private Equity
Structures: Modeling Real Estate Development Joint Venture Agreements, 11 J.
ECON. & FIN. EDUC. 87, 87 (2012) (noting the complexity of private equity investments).
192. As one scholar has noted (albeit in a different context), over the last
twenty years private equity’s acquisition contracts have seen only two significant shifts (adding equity commitment letters and enhanced debt commitment
letters). Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L.
REV. 481, 493–94 (2009).
193. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1216–1244 (2003).
194. See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465 (1990) (observing that “professional managers will ‘follow the herd’ if they are concerned about how others will assess their
ability to make sound judgements”); see also Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13,
at 356 (finding that herd behavior occurs as a consequence of agents’ rational
attempts to enhance their reputations).

2018]

THE PUBLIC COST OF PRIVATE EQUITY

1893

tasked with negotiating governance structures want these structures to succeed (in the sense of realizing profits from their investments), but they also have a separate and personal interest
in maintaining, or building, their own individual reputations.
Sensitivity to reputational effects can lead to conservative behavior and a preference for the status quo. If managers innovate
in their contracts and fail, their reputations will suffer. But if
they fail as a result of doing what everyone else is doing, their
reputations will not face the same harm because observers will
be more likely to chalk the failure up to circumstances outside
the individual’s control. 195 Even if the same logic applies to successful outcomes (that is, the market will reward individuals for
innovations that succeed), risk-averse individual decision-makers normally do not weigh these benefits as heavily as the potential losses from failure.196 Thus the cost of innovation is high
from the perspective of reputation-sensitive individuals. 197
Second, once a particular set of contractual and governance
structures are in place, the parties may experience a status quo
bias leading them to perpetuate current structures over alternative ones.198 The status quo bias, which has been illustrated in a
number of contexts, leads individuals to prefer allocations or arrangements that are viewed as the status quo over alternative

195. See Scharfstein & Stein, supra note 194, at 466 (discussing the relationship between unpredictable components, profitability of investments, and herd
decision-making as it pertains to reputational differences of managers). This
phenomenon is closely linked with a separate behavioral trait, conformity bias,
where individuals tend to conform their beliefs to those of other members of
their peer groups. See SOLOMON E. ASCH, Forces in the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 450, 483–94 (1952).
196. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 358 (noting that the “penalty
for a bad outcome will often be disproportionately severe in comparison to [the]
reward for a good outcome” in the context of standardized contract terms and
herd mentality).
197. For a more extensive discussion of the obstacles to contractual innovation, see generally John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in
Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 133 (2014).
198. See Korobkin, supra note 181, at 121–23 (discussing experiments confirming status quo biases in favor of a default term); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1325 (1990) (providing evidence from studies showing an instant endowment effect exists—that the value individuals assign an object increases as soon
as the individual is given the object); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser,
Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 47–48 (1988)
(showing through a series of experiments that individuals disproportionately
maintain current or previous decisions).
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arrangements, all else equal. 199 Here, where private equity
structures have gained such a high level of uniformity, and thus
are more likely to be viewed as default or status quo terms, the
parties negotiating the terms of private equity investments can
be expected to default towards maintaining those structures.
Parties that have a strong interest in maintaining these structures, such as private equity firms, will also have an inherent
bargaining advantage over others due to this status quo bias.
Third, individuals are strongly susceptible to anchoring effects, providing yet another behavioral bias in favor of prevailing
governance structures. 200 A number of studies have shown that
once initial reference points, or anchors, have been set, those anchors have a significant impact on parties’ judgments, and subsequent adjustments from those anchoring points tend to be
small and incremental. A famous example came from a study of
housing price estimates. 201 Participants were asked to estimate
the value of a house (which they could visit and inspect). 202 Participants were also given an asking price for the house, which
was not in fact the asking price for the house, but was instead
either substantially higher or substantially lower than the real
asking price.203 It turned out that participants who were given
high fictional asking prices estimated the real value of the house
to be higher than did participants who were given low fictional
asking prices. 204 The differences in valuation were stark: students that were quoted $119,900 as the asking price estimated
the house’s value at $116,833, while students that were quoted
$149,900 as the asking price estimated it at $144,454. 205 In the
context of private equity, both numerical and nonnumerical an-

199. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625 (1998).
200. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 362 (highlighting studies that
confirm strong anchoring biases); Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale,
Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective
on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 84, 94–96 (1987) (describing a study of the anchoring effects of home
prices); Eric A. Zacks, Contract Review: Cognitive Bias, Moral Hazard, and Situational Pressure, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 379, 394 (2015) (proposing the initial draft of a contract may have an anchoring effect).
201. Northcraft & Neale, supra note 200, at 87, 92.
202. Id. at 87 (describing the methodology used in both studies).
203. Id. at 92 (referring to the listing price of properties used within the
study).
204. Id. at 92–93.
205. Id. at 93 tbl.4.
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choring points exist. The source of these anchors is not just previous deals (i.e., the governance structures of previous private
equity funds), but also the prevalent practice in the industry of
private equity firms providing the initial draft of governing documents. Thus, by the very fact that private equity firms are setting initial expectations about governance structures, these governance structures can anchor the negotiations in a way that
ensures that changes will be small and marginal. The expectations of the parties will be affected deeply by the initial anchor
points that are established.
Finally, investors in private equity may suffer from an overconfidence bias that leads them to underestimate the likelihood
that unfavorable governing arrangements will in fact harm
them. Overconfidence bias generally refers to the tendency of
people to overestimate their abilities, their control over results,
and the likelihood of positive outcomes. 206 One classic example
is that the vast majority of people believe that they are less likely
to get divorced than the overall divorce rate suggests.207 Studies
have shown that overconfidence bias is both pervasive and powerful: it leads venture capitalists to overpay for startup investments, 208 investors to believe that they can beat the market, 209
and CEOs to systematically overestimate the returns they can
generate from takeovers. 210 In much the same way, overconfidence bias may explain why investors willingly accept private
206. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 1051, 1091–95 (2000); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 673, 689 (2005).
207. One study of marriage-license applicants found that, while respondents
accurately estimated that approximately fifty percent of marriages will end in
divorce, when asked about the likelihood of their own marriage ending in divorce, the median response was zero percent. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery,
When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993).
208. See Andrew L. Zacharakis & Dean A. Shepherd, The Nature of Information and Overconfidence on Venture Capitalists’ Decision Making, 16 J. BUS.
VENTURING 311, 311–12 (2001) (studying overconfidence in venture capitalists
and discussing factors leading to this overconfidence).
209. David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” To Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN.
L. REV. 537, 555 (2006).
210. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 597, 624–25 (1989) (discussing manager optimism as a potential reason
for overestimating a target company’s value); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey
Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction,
89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 42 (2008) (finding overconfident CEOs are more likely to
make lower-quality acquisitions).
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equity’s costly governance structures. If they underestimate the
probability of conflict, they will underprioritize protective provisions in governing documents.211 If they overestimate the returns from their investment, they will be more likely to accept
high fees from private equity firms. Two additional factors suggest that private equity investors are particularly susceptible to
overconfidence bias. First, studies have shown that the bias is
especially powerful when a decision appears to be supported by
a group consensus and when decisions must be made quickly,
precisely the conditions that prevail in many private equity contexts. 212 Second, the fact that limited-partner investors are sophisticated investors with substantial resources and devoted
personnel exacerbates the problem: overconfidence effects are
generally greater in experts than in novices.213
For all of these reasons, private equity firms benefit from
strong path dependence effects that work to entrench current
governance structures. Far from being the result of efficient bargaining between investors and firms, private equity agreements
are strongly influenced by the lingering effects of history.
B. COOPERATION PROBLEMS
A separate reason for the persistence of private equity’s
structure in the face of evident governance costs is the difficulty
of coordinating investor action to press for change. Cooperation
problems have long been recognized as a source of agency costs
in public corporations, 214 but they have received less study in the
context of private equity. And yet they are arguably a greater
source of agency costs in private equity than they are in public
corporations, for at least two reasons: bilateral bargaining and
alternative investments.
211. See Kristen M. Blankley, The Ethics and Practice of Drafting Pre-Dispute Resolution Clauses, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 743, 763 (2016) (explaining an
optimistic overconfidence bias may prevent parties from negotiating alternative
dispute resolution clauses in contracts); Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL.
281, 295 (2006) (finding that while lawyers in mediation recognize bias, most
are unwilling to concede they are biased).
212. Ruben Orive, Group Consensus, Action Immediacy, and Opinion Confidence, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 573, 573 (1988).
213. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 498 (2002).
214. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT,
PROMISES BROKEN 131 (2008) (discussing challenges to ensuring good corporate
governance for corporations with widely dispersed individual shareholders).
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Let us assume that investors in private equity firms would
prefer to have lower fees, greater governance rights, and easier
exit mechanisms. These changes to the private equity structure
might cut into private equity firms’ profits, but if investors collectively demanded them, then private equity firms would be
forced to concede. Why, then, would investors not cooperate to
demand these changes?
The first reason is that large investors now increasingly
have the option to negotiate side agreements that grant them
special treatment. 215 If an investor has the option to achieve its
aims through bilateral bargaining, or alternatively through
costly multiparty negotiations that can tend toward compromise
and lowest-common-denominator positions, it will likely opt for
the former absent some compelling external rationale. 216 Adding
to this problem is that investors might well prefer to have other
investors not share in the greater governance rights that they
manage to negotiate: an investor could benefit from the stability
provided by having other investors locked in to their investments, let alone the additional fees paid by unpreferred investors. Thus the rise of bilateral bargaining has reduced the incentive for investors to cooperate in demanding changes to
suboptimal governance structures.217
Another kind of cooperation problem arises from the existence of multiple funds under a single private equity firm’s umbrella. Private equity firms today often raise multiple funds,
with each fund having its own set of investors and its own set of
portfolio companies. 218 The multiple fund structure provides investors with a high level of customizability, allowing them to invest in only the funds that they believe are the best fit, but it
also creates a conflict of interest. 219 Private equity firms have
215. See discussion in supra Part II.C.
216. See Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A
Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1,
14–18 (2003) (proposing that due to the possibility of parties having a veto
power in multiparty negotiations, side deals may be needed to ensure a zone of
possible agreement is available).
217. Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639
(1998) (explaining why the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties has reduced cooperation among least developed countries); William Magnuson, Unilateral Corporate Regulation, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 521 (2017) (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of multilateral and unilateral action).
218. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 25, at 46–47 (describing the
potential conflicts that arise when private equity firms oversee multiple funds).
219. Id.
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limited institutional capacities for identifying, monitoring, and
managing the investments that make up their funds. If a private
equity firm has two funds, one with general partner (GP)friendly terms and one with GP-unfriendly terms, 220 the private
equity firm will have strong incentives to devote more time and
energy to the fund that has GP-friendly terms, all else equal. After all, if one fund grants the private equity firm a right to
twenty-five percent of the profits from investments, while the
other fund grants the firm only fifteen percent, the private equity firm would rationally direct more promising portfolio companies into the GP-friendly fund and devote more resources to
enhancing its profits. 221 Limited-partner investors, recognizing
this dynamic, have little incentive to push for more investorfriendly terms in their own fund unless they can be ensured that
the investors in other funds also have similar terms.
Both of these problems (bilateral bargaining and multiple
funds) create situations that closely resemble the classic prisoner’s dilemma. 222 Jointly, the parties would be better off if they
could cooperate, but separately, each party has an incentive to
defect and reap the rewards. 223 In the real world, many prisoner’s dilemma–type situations are resolved because interactions are repeated, outcomes are observed, and cheating can be

220. A GP-friendly term is a term that favors the interests of the GP over
those of the limited partners. A GP-unfriendly term is a term that favors the
interests of the limited partners over those of the general partner. Higher management fees, for example, would be GP-friendly, while lower ones would be GPunfriendly.
221. This dynamic is more than just theoretical. Studies have shown that
the inclusion of GP-friendly terms in private equity governance documents affect fund performance and behavior, including the efforts that private equity
firms expend on their investments, the riskiness of investments that funds
make, and the timing of exits from those investments. Niklas Hüther, Is the
Whole Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Behavioral Effects of Management
Compensation (Sept. 18, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://www
.fmaconferences.org/Nashville/Papers/sum_of_parts_nh.pdf; Niklas Hüther et
al., Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Management Contracts 18–20 (Feb. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.rhsmith
.umd.edu/files/Documents/Departments/Finance/seminarspring2015/robinson
.pdf (finding better investment performance for funds that include GP-friendly
deal-by-deal contracts, suggesting this could be due to higher-risk investments
throughout the fund’s life and due to a reduced incentive for general partners
to exit early).
222. For a comprehensive description of large prisoner ’s dilemma situations,
see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 3–5 (1990).
223. Id.
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punished.224 But with private equity, all of these conditions are
dubious. Interactions are much less frequent (once an investor
has committed to a fund, its capital is tied up for the duration of
the fund, which is often ten to twelve years). 225 Outcomes are
harder to observe: private equity firms often do not disclose the
terms of side deals they reach with individual investors, or the
structure of other funds. 226 And finally, even the identity of other
investors is often confidential. 227 So, even if an investor determines that other investors have cheated and negotiated better
terms on their own, it is unclear how punishment could be meted
out. All of these difficulties highlight the magnitude of the cooperation problems that investors face in their investment decisions.
C. REPUTATION
As the previous Sections have demonstrated, private equity
firms have interests that do not fully align with those of their
investors, and the investors have little ability to monitor and
control the actions of the firms in order to deter misbehavior.
This creates strong agency costs and may incentivize excessive
risk-taking and rent-extraction by private equity firms to the
detriment of investors. Despite the governance costs created by
current private equity models, there are strong currents pushing
against reform. Both path-dependence effects and cooperation
problems contribute to entrenching current governance structures in place. Which brings us to one final constraint on private
equity behavior: reputation. 228

224. For a formal description of the conditions necessary for cooperation to
evolve, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 164–72
(1994); JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 260–79
(1994).
225. Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity
Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1071, 1086 n.31 (2008).
226. For a discussion of the lengths to which private equity firms go to maintain the confidentiality of their agreements, see Gretchen Morgenson, Behind
Private Equity’s Curtain, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
2014/10/19/business/retirement/behind-private-equitys-curtain.html.
227. CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, at 63.
228. For a discussion of the importance of reputation to private equity firms
and the ways that private equity firms use their reputations in the debt markets, see de Fontenay, supra note 41, at 134–39.

1900

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:1847

It is often said that reputation serves as a powerful constraint on private equity firm behavior. 229 Firms raise new funds
regularly, and if they earn a reputation for mistreating their investors, they will find it difficult to find new investors willing to
commit their capital to them. 230 Thus private equity firms should
value their reputations highly and seek to avoid actions that
would damage those reputations. So, even if investors commit
their capital to private equity firms carte blanche, the argument
goes, they can take comfort in the fact that firms have nonlegal
incentives to maximize investor value even in the absence of explicit contractual constraints.231
But there are reasons to doubt that reputation is as effective
a mechanism in private equity as many make it out it to be. 232
First, reputation can only constrain a party’s behavior if the
party believes that others will receive information about the
party’s past behavior and base their decision making on that
past behavior. 233 In other words, reputation is only as good as
the information that underlies it.
As amply discussed in previous sections, the private equity
industry is built around tightly controlled flows of information. 234 Private equity firms rarely make information about
their investments and governance structures available to the
public. 235 They also tightly control the flow of information to
their own investors. 236 In this atmosphere of extreme confidentiality, it is unsurprising that a number of studies have found

229. See Matthew D. Cain et al., Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in
Private Equity Contracting and Strategic Default, 40 J. CORP. L. 565, 565 (2015)
(finding that “private equity firms and targets rely on reputation to fill intentional contractual gaps”).
230. Id. at 575–76.
231. See id. (explaining reputation and the potential for repeat transactions
are front-end incentives while penalties for failure to perform and higher buyout
pricing are back-end consequences of misbehavior).
232. See, e.g., James C. Spindler, How Private Is Private Equity, and at What
Cost?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 332–33 (2009) (arguing that “[t]here is a tendency,
however, to overstate the salutary effect of reputation” in private equity).
233. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 231, 244–49 (2009); Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox,
9 THEORY & DECISION 127, 139 (1978); Jean Tirole, A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality), 63 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 18 (1996).
234. See discussion in supra Part II.B.3.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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that private equity firm disclosures systematically tend to overstate fund performance.237 This noise surrounding information
about past performance renders it difficult for current investors,
let alone potential investors, to identify and accurately assess information about private equity firm behavior. Of course, in egregious cases of misbehavior by private equity firms, such as outright fraud or theft, the information may well come out, 238 but in
other cases of less severity (for example, less than diligent monitoring or marginally higher than expected fees), past misbehavior may be overwhelmed by other, optimistic information disclosed by the fund.
Second, reputation is not a monolithic trait. Private equity
firms do not have purely good or purely bad reputations. They
have reputations for possessing certain traits and taking certain
actions. Some have reputations for industrial expertise: Silver
Lake, for example, is known for its deep expertise in the technology sector,239 while EnCap Investments is known for its oil and
gas investments. 240 Private equity firms also have different reputations with different audiences. For example, private equity
firms care deeply about their reputation with banks, as their acquisition model is premised on the ability to receive loans at low
interest rates. 241 Thus they have an interest in not defaulting on
their debts, as doing so will make it more difficult to access the
debt markets in their next funding round. They also care about
their reputation with target companies, as they regularly buy
companies and participate in auctions for companies. 242 Thus
they have an interest in not backing out of acquisition agreements with target companies, as doing so will make them less
237. See, e.g., Douglas Cumming et al., International Private Equity Valuation and Disclosure, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 617, 641 (2009); Douglas Cumming & Uwe Walz, Private Equity Returns and Disclosure Around the World, 41
J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 727, 751 (2010).
238. For example, in the SEC’s investigation of Apollo Global’s fee practices,
it came to light that one of Apollo’s executives was twice caught “improperly
charging personal items and services” to Apollo’s investors. See Protess, supra
note 153.
239. See Amy Or, Neuberger Berman’s Dyal Capital Takes Minority Stake in
Silver Lake, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/neuberger
-bermans-dyal-capital-takes-minority-stake-in-silver-lake-1468366758.
240. See Sabrina Willmer, EnCap Investments Said To Seek $5 Billion for
Energy Fund, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-10-22/encap-investments-said-to-seek-5-billion-for-energy
-fund.
241. See de Fontenay, supra note 41, at 134–39.
242. For a discussion of the role of reputation in constraining private equity
behavior vis-à-vis target companies, see Cain et al., supra note 229, at 578–79.
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credible partners for potential targets.
Given the multiplicity of reputations that private equity
firms maintain, it is unclear whether, in any given case, private
equity firms will place greater value on their reputation vis-àvis investors than their reputation vis-à-vis creditors, targets, or
along any of the many other dimensions of reputation. It is not
difficult to imagine that these reputations may sometimes conflict. For example, it may at times make sense for portfolio companies to default on their loans, but private equity firms, cherishing their reputations with banks, may refuse to do so if they
fear that it will make future capital raises more difficult. Or, it
may make sense for a fund to back out of a merger agreement
with a target if the market has shifted and the deal no longer
looks like a profitable one, but a private equity firm may refuse
to terminate the agreement if doing so will make it more difficult
for its other funds to close their deals. The point here is not that
a private equity firm’s reputation with investors is unimportant,
but rather that it is one set of a larger set of reputations that
private equity firms seek to maintain, and that in many cases, it
may well be overlooked in favor of maximizing these other reputations. Thus blanket assertions that investors can rest assured
that, whatever their contractual protections, reputation will ensure that private equity firms seek to maximize investor wealth,
are overstated. 243
One final reason why reputation may be ineffective in constraining private equity firm behavior is that individual decision-makers within firms often have interests that diverge from
those of the firm itself. It is well known that reputational constraints on misbehavior often break down in endgame scenarios:
that is, if an individual knows that he will never need to interact
with a counterparty again, he is more likely to cheat and pocket
one-time gains at the expense of the counterparty. 244 After all,
reputation is only valuable to the extent it can be used in the
future. This incentive is amplified when gains from misbehavior
are large and the costs are uncertain or not fully internalized. 245
243. See id. at 593–94 (finding beyond certain boundaries, reputation is not
a sufficient enforcement mechanism).
244. Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J.
ECON. PERSP. 187, 191 (1988); see David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation
in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 58, 65 (1995) (noting “defection is certain on the last trial”
in a finitely repeated prisoner ’s dilemma).
245. See Scott E. Masten & Jens Prüfer, On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 389–
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In the context of private equity, while private equity firms themselves may have indefinite time horizons, the individual managers do not. Managers retire, they change jobs, and they have
other interests. For all these reasons, the reputational incentives
of individual managers are not fully aligned with those of the
firm where they work. Given the stratospheric levels of compensation prevalent in today’s private equity industry, 246 these incentives can sharply skew the interests of individual managers
to the detriment of investors. Even if the manager misbehaves
in a way that damages the firm’s reputation, the manager himself, who has limited time horizons, will not fully internalize the
cost of this harm. The rewards to individuals from excessive risktaking are so high, and the costs are so uncertain, that managers
may well adopt strategies that do not align with the interests of
their investors.
*****
This Part has argued that private equity’s governance costs,
far from being the result of efficient bargaining between sophisticated parties, are instead the result of market failures at the
heart of the industry. Private equity structures exhibit strong
path dependence, resisting reform even in the face of dramatic
changes in the market. They also create collective-action problems for investors, who face steep obstacles to cooperating in efforts to pressure private equity firms to change their ways. Finally, reputation is not an effective bulwark against
opportunistic behavior by private equity firms, given the variegated content of that reputation and the differing reputational
incentives of particular individuals that make up the firm. The
next Part will take up a final question: what steps can be taken
to improve private equity’s governance structure?
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The governance structure of private equity creates a number
of pernicious misalignments between the interests of private equity firms and their investors. These misalignments include
compensation that incentivizes excessive risk-taking, governing
documents that strongly constrain the rights of investors, and

91 (2014) (predicting a shift from informal community enforcement to formal
court enforcement “as the value of trade between distant or dissimilar transactors increases”).
246. See, e.g., Alden, supra note 4.
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opportunities for disparate treatment between favored and disfavored partners. 247 While the contract terms of privately negotiated agreements might not typically be a matter of public importance, we have a strong reason to care about the plight of
private equity investors, namely, that the majority of private equity investors are pension funds, endowments, and sovereign
wealth funds, who handle money for the benefit of the public. 248
Thus private equity’s governance costs are in a real way public
costs. We should care deeply about resolving them. To that end,
this Part sets forth several proposals for improving the corporate
governance of private equity and mechanisms for implementing
those changes.
A. GOVERNANCE CHANGES
Two general governance changes present themselves. The
first focuses on the particular governance costs of private equity
and attempts to reach better substantive outcomes in these areas. The second focuses on the process and procedure of arriving
at negotiated agreements and attempts to fix the breakdowns in
process that lead to these suboptimal results. The benefit of the
first, substance-based approach is that it directly addresses the
fundamental misalignments between management and investor
interests. The benefit of the second, process-based approach is
that it refrains from imposing external rules of behavior on privately negotiated deals and instead creates environments more
conducive to efficient bargaining.249
1. Improving Outcomes
Several substantive reforms could reduce private equity’s
governance costs. First, private equity structures could be revised to skew private equity firm compensation in favor of pure
equity interests in their funds, as opposed to management fees
and carried interests. As described above, management fees create an incentive for firms to raise as much capital as possible,
regardless of the reasonable possibilities for its investment, and
247. See supra Part II.
248. See INSTITUTIONAL LTD. PARTNERS ASS’N, THE POWER OF THE NETWORK: 2015 ILPA ANNUAL REPORT 15 (documenting consistent membership
growth).
249. These two approaches bear similarities to the command-and-control
versus market-based approaches to regulation. See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275. However, as will be explained
further below, it may be possible to mitigate private equity’s governance costs
through changes implemented outside of traditional legislative action.
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then, at the end of the investment period, to ensure that as much
of that capital is actually used to acquire companies, regardless
of the reasonable possibilities of profits on the acquisitions. 250
Carried interests also create strong incentives for private equity
firms to take excessive risk, as private equity firms capture
much of the upside from profitable undertakings, while bearing
none of the downside in the case of loss. 251 Pure equity interests—that is, a percentage ownership of the partnership interests in the private equity fund—more closely align the interests
of private equity firms with the interests of their investors, as
they require private equity firms to share in the upside and
downside of their investments.252
Second, private equity structures could be reformed to grant
limited-partner investors greater governance rights, including
voting, transfer, and information rights. Investors would not
necessarily need broad governance rights in all of these areas in
order to ensure that they are protected from misbehavior or
shirking by private equity firms. Instead, greater governance
rights in one area might obviate the need for greater governance
rights in another. For example, voice (voting rights) could serve
as an effective substitute for exit (transfer rights), 253 and thus if
investors have a liquid market in which to dispose of their interest in private equity funds, they might not need strong rights to
vote on fundamental business matters, and vice-versa.254
Third, private equity structures could be changed to require
private equity firms to grant equal treatment to all investors.
This requirement, while certainly far from the norm, is not as
foreign a concept as it might appear at first blush. Private equity
firms already grant many favored investors so-called most-favored-nation provisions in their side letters, thereby ensuring
that these investors can benefit from any privileges or rights
that the firms grant other investors. 255 Extending most-favorednation status to all investors would resolve many of the problems
associated with preferential treatment and would allow less sophisticated investors to benefit from the expertise of more sophisticated ones.
250. See supra Part II.A.1.
251. For further discussion, see supra Part II.A.2.
252. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9, at 262–64.
253. Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93 NEB. L. REV. 313, 318–19 (2014).
254. See Coffee, supra note 138, at 1281–82 (discussing the potential tradeoff between liquidity and control).
255. Volet, supra note 167.
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2. Improving Information
A separate approach to mitigating private equity’s governance costs would be to improve the information provided to investors. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that enduring change could
be achieved in the private equity industry without more and better disclosure to investors. The SEC has repeatedly fined private
equity firms (including many of the largest and most prestigious
firms) for improperly disclosing fees and expenses to investors. 256 Basic and accurate information about the compensation
of private equity firms and the expenses charged to investors is
an essential part of reforming private equity’s structure. But it
is not enough.
In order for investors to assess the risks of their investment,
and to mitigate agency costs, investors must be provided with
full information about partnership terms, side arrangements (if
any), and fund activities and performance. Such information
might require changes to the confidentiality provisions in many
limited partnership agreements today. 257 But without such information, governance rights could be neutered by limited disclosure.258 Better information would lead to better monitoring,
allowing investors to observe the behavior of private equity firms
and identify misconduct. 259
Just as importantly, a more accurate and comprehensive
disclosure regime would improve the quality of the bargaining
process in private equity. By reducing the problems of asymmetric information that bedevil current negotiating frameworks,
greater information about fund structures can help ensure that
bargaining achieves efficient outcomes. Efficient bargaining is
based on the premise that both sides understand the costs and
benefits of the terms that they are negotiating over. If one side
cannot accurately assess its potential gains and losses, the bargaining process can break down, leading to inefficient, one-sided
256. Protess, supra note 153.
257. For an example limited partnership agreement, see CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, at 63–64.
258. See Anita Indira Anand, An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance: Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229, 249
(2006) (“It is difficult for investors to make informed decisions if there is no disclosure requirement, since firms may choose not to disclose information relating
to governance in which investors are interested.”).
259. But see OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU
WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) (arguing
that mandated disclosure does not lead to better informed decisions by consumers of the information).
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agreements.260 Full disclosure would require both the terms and
conditions of the particular investor’s investment, but also any
side arrangements or special treatment of other investors, as
well as any potential conflicts of interest with other funds. These
sorts of disclosures have been widely recommended in the context of investment banks and should be extended to private equity as well.261
B. MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE
These proposed governance changes could greatly improve
the alignment of interests between private equity firms and their
investors and thereby reduce private equity’s governance costs.
But given that private equity’s governance structure has been
stubbornly resistant to change, the question arises what mechanisms can be used to promote change in the industry. Three answers present themselves.
The first is regulation. When markets are not functioning
properly, governments often step in to correct market failures
and create incentives for socially optimal behavior. 262 This was
the impetus behind Dodd-Frank, the sweeping reform of Wall
Street that followed the 2008 financial crisis.263 A Dodd-Frank
for Private Equity would institute more comprehensive regulation of the financial incentives and disclosure requirements of
private equity firms, and likewise include investor protection reforms intended to ensure that limited partner investors are not
saddled with oppressive restrictions. But just as Dodd-Frank
was criticized for imposing excessive compliance costs on banks,
regulatory reform of the private equity industry risks weighing
down an industry that is heavily dependent on streamlining and
efficiency. 264 The difficulty is finding a form of regulation that
260. See Joseph L. Lemon, Jr., Don’t Let Me Down (Round): Avoiding Illusory Terms in Venture Capital Financing in the Post-Internet Bubble Era,
39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 1, 22 (2003) (exploring information asymmetries between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs).
261. See Andrew F. Tuch, Banker Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions, 94
TEX. L. REV. 1079, 1154 (2016).
262. For a discussion of regulatory approaches to resolving market and behavioral failures, see generally Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral
Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2014).
263. See, e.g., Michael T. Cappucci, Prudential Regulation and the
Knowledge Problem, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 2–5 (2014).
264. See Jeb Hensarling, After Five Years, Dodd-Frank Is a Failure, WALL
ST. J. (July 19, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-five-years-dodd-frank
-is-a-failure-1437342607.
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reduces private equity’s governance costs without burdening
firms with costly and unnecessary red tape.
Which leads to the second mechanism for inducing change:
namely, greater investor cooperation. In order to overcome the
path dependence and anchoring effects that have hardwired current governance structures in place, large limited-partner investors could come together to coordinate investment policies, by,
for example, promulgating model private equity governance
terms or template limited partnership agreements. While not
having the force of law, these best practices would, at a minimum, provide strong social reasons for changing current structures. They would show that other investors believed these approaches to be optimal,265 and they would provide reassurance
that any provisions included in the model terms had received
close attention and scrutiny by top practitioners in the field. 266
If a few large investors, such as CalPERS 267 and Teachers Retirement System of Texas, 268 adopted these forms as their standard documents, they could provide smaller investors with muchneeded leverage in the negotiation process. Just as importantly,
these private-sector efforts could serve as an alternative to and
a guidepost for public sector regulation.
A third and final mechanism for instigating change is information intermediaries. 269 Private equity firms have interests
265. A number of studies have indicated that information about peer preferences (or social proof ) can have strong behavioral effects more broadly. See SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 451–59 (1952); David Hirshleifer, The
Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades,
in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188, 189 (Mariano Tommasi &
Kathryn Ierulli eds., 1995); TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 78 (1995); P. Wesley
Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social
Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 429, 429 (2007); Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 51, 59 (2010).
266. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 350 (discussing reasons why
standard contract terms are used).
267. See Organization, CALPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/about/
organization (last updated June 29, 2015), (claiming to be the nation’s largest
public pension fund).
268. See About TRS, TEACHER RET. SYS. OF TEX., https://www.trs.texas.gov/
Pages/about_trs.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (claiming to be the largest public retirement system in Texas).
269. Information intermediaries are third parties that verify information
provided by the parties to a transaction. They are often viewed as an engine for
increased market efficiency by reducing the cost of gathering and analyzing
complex information. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 618–21 (1984); Ronald J. Mann,
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that do not always align with those of their investors, and the
reputational constraints on their misconduct are not as robust
as one might hope. But there are ways to make reputation play
a stronger role in improving private equity’s governance without
relying solely on the reputation of the private equity firm itself.
Independent information intermediaries, such as ratings agencies or third-party consultants and advisors, could step in to help
align the interests of private equity firms and investors by staking their own reputations on successful outcomes.270 They could
examine firm management, fund structures, and compensation
incentives to provide an independent analysis of the quality of
fund investments to potential limited partners. 271 The success of
these information intermediaries would depend directly on their
reputation for accurately assessing fund structures, and thus
their reputation would not be fragmented and conflicted in the
ways that private equity firm reputation is. Just as proxy advisors today have significant influence on the investment decisions
of institutional investors, and thus place strong pressure on companies to adopt more investor-friendly governance practices, 272
information intermediaries in the private equity sphere could
serve as a strong force for improved governance structures.
These three mechanisms for reform—regulation, investor
cooperation, and information intermediation—could serve to

Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2269–71
(1999).
270. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Regulating Informational Intermediation,
1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 58, 58–59 (2011) (listing various types of informational
intermediaries).
271. One might ask why limited-partner investors are not sufficiently sophisticated to perform this analysis themselves. While one might hope that
large institutional investors would have the capacity to assess the costs and
benefits of their investments, in practice they often rely on the advice of specialists in making their investment decisions, in effect outsourcing many investment decisions to outside experts. See Legislative Proposals To Enhance Capital
Formation, Transparency, and Regulatory Accountability: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of the Society of Corporate Secretaries
& Governance Professionals and the National Investor Relations Institute),
https://www.niri.org/NIRI/media/NIRI/Advocacy/Society-NIRI-Statement-to
-HFSC-Subcommittee-Proxy-Advisory-Firm-Reform-Act-FINAL-VERSION-5
-25-2016.pdf (concluding that “[p]roxy advisory firms exert undue influence in
the proxy voting process, as they generate voting recommendations for their
clients, and, in fact, make voting decisions for some of their clients”).
272. See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887,
906 (2007) (explaining types of pressure the corporate governance industry may
put on companies).
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overcome the forces that have entrenched private equity’s problematic governance structure. In doing so, they might lead to important, and beneficial, changes in the way that the private equity industry works.
CONCLUSION
It is often argued that private equity’s success can be best
explained as a result of its uniquely beneficial governance structure, one that reduces agency costs to a minimum and closely
aligns the interests of management and ownership. This Article
has argued that private equity’s so-called governance dividend
is overstated and that, in fact, private equity’s structure creates
a number of intractable governance costs. These governance
costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive
risk-taking by private equity firms, minimal governance rights
for investors, and opportunities for favoritism and discrimination. We should care deeply about these costs because the public
is heavily invested in private equity, through pension funds, endowments, and sovereign wealth funds. This Article has suggested a number of reforms—from improving information flows
to reducing conflicts of interest—that could help improve private
equity’s governance structure, but it is hoped that these suggestions are merely a starting point of a longer conversation.

